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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
 
Cuba is a centrally planned economy that has introduced gradual changes towards a 
market economy. However, many of these changes are only partial or have been 
reversed, especially in the agricultural sector. The country depends on food imports as 
a result of low agricultural productivity, which has often been blamed on technical 
deficiencies, lack of resources and climatic disturbances. This dissertation, however, 
focuses on the little explored role that economic and political institutions have on the 
low productivity of Cuba’s agricultural sector. The economic institutions governing 
land use, access to markets, and the organization of farms (for example, collective or 
individual) have an impact on production since they determine the incentives and 
constraints faced by producers and other economic actors. Moreover, the study of the 
political and economic institutions of Cuba’s agricultural sector may help to elucidate 
the reasons behind its partial and failed reforms. Institutions change slowly or fail to 
change for various reasons, including the political opposition from actors that expect 
their economic returns and political capital to decrease as a result of reforms. 
In order to understand the production problems of Cuban agriculture and to evaluate 
the constraints the country faces in implementing successful reforms, this dissertation 
studies the institutional framework governing production and marketing in Cuba, as 
well as its impacts on production and food supply, and the political and economic 
dynamics driving its evolution. The objectives of the dissertation are not only to cover 
the gap in the published literature regarding these topics, but also to inform policy 
makers and rural development organizations working in the country.  
The dissertation is organized around three research papers. The first paper addresses 
the institutional framework of Cuba’s agricultural sector and its impacts on the 
performance of different producer types. The second paper explores in more detail the 
impact of these institutions on collective production, food availability and food 
security at household level. This study is one of only two known analyses that 
quantify household expenditures in Cuba, and the first to study the frequency and 
diversity of food consumption among rural households in the country. In the third 
paper, the reforms of Cuba’s agricultural sector are analyzed through the lens of 
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theories of institutional change. The primary data used in the dissertation was 
collected during two research stays (October 2007- March 2008, and April 2009), and 
was complemented with official statistical reports, published and unpublished studies.  
The first paper presents and compares different producers of the cattle sub-sector 
(private producers, state-dependent collectives and state farms), their access to land 
and agricultural input and output markets, the legislation governing their cattle 
husbandry, and their performance. The three main producer types differ in their 
property rights for land and cattle, as well as in their access to illegal markets. Private 
producers have different degrees of use rights over land and cattle, from proprietors to 
usufructuaries and landless, and have better access to illegal markets, but at the risk of 
fines, confiscation of property or jail convictions. The illegal markets offer much 
higher prices than the legal markets forced upon state farms and state-dependent 
collectives, who have, respectively, null or only usufruct rights over land. The state 
farms have economic returns due to the administrative control of other producers and 
not from their own production, while the state-dependent collectives have very limited 
rights to residual income from their cattle production. Private producers have more 
benefits from consumption and sales, and despite facing higher risks, they are the only 
ones showing a constant increase of their herd size in the last years. Moreover, it was 
found that the lack of mechanism to enter or exit production causes an overall 
decrease of efficiency by forbidding efficient producers to enter the sector and by not 
allowing the worst producers to exit production. The fact that at least one of the 
producer types is successful casts doubt on the prevailing idea that production 
problems are a result of technical deficiencies or lack of resources. 
The second paper deals in more detail with the largest producer type in terms of land 
described in the first paper: the state-dependent collective farms. This study explores 
collective agricultural production, as well as poverty and food access of collective 
farm households by using principal component analysis and other methods. It was 
found that relative poverty and diversity of food consumption in the studied 
households is characterized by differences in the quality and frequency of food items 
that are not supplied by the state’s food rationing system, but that come from 
individual or collective food production for home consumption. Moreover, the 
relative poverty status of the households is not related to the economic or productive 
performance in the main activities of their collective farms (in this case, beef and 
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milk). These results, as well as in-depth interviews with managers and workers of 
collective farms, expose severe incentive problems in collective agricultural 
production, as workers are not rewarded for their work in the farms’ main activities. 
At the same time, the state restricts the collective and private food production for 
home consumption as they compete for labour and resources with the collective 
farm’s beef and milk production intended for the supply of the state’s food rationing 
system. These incentive problems hurt the milk and beef that the Cuban population 
should receive with the food rationing system. At the same time, the food security of 
the collective workers is also hurt when the land for private and collective food 
production for home consumption is restricted by the state as a way to “protect” milk 
and beef production. 
Several reforms are needed to correct the incentive problems exposed in the first two 
papers, but it is not clear if these reforms are possible. To address this question, the 
third paper explores the evolution of the economic institutions in the agricultural 
sector of Cuba by evaluating the historical political power dynamics in the sector. The 
agricultural sector of the country is marked by permanent conflicts between private 
producers, defined by their strong interests for the establishment of free markets and 
full property rights over their land, and other actors that have opposing interests, such 
as the political elite and bureaucrats that control agricultural production and 
marketing. The country has only partially adopted property rights over land and 
market incentives for producers during times of extreme crises that have threatened 
the elite’s permanence in power. Moreover, once the threats or consumer unrest have 
decreased, the reforms are often reversed and alternative solutions are devised to 
placate consumers. The reversal of the reforms do not only respond to the political 
elite’s interest of permanence in power, but are also a result of the political opposition 
of bureaucrats that block or delay the implementation of reforms whenever these 
threaten their political capital and future economic returns. The adoption of 
institutions that result in a more efficient agriculture would increase the power of 
private agricultural producers and give political power to new and emerging groups 
such as the workers of the state-dependent collective farms. This redistribution of 
political power would occur at the expense of the bureaucracy in state farms and 
agricultural or food distribution state enterprises. The reforms announced since 2007 
seem to point to a strategy of limiting the influence of the bureaucracy with massive 
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lay-offs, the elimination or merging of state farms and enterprises and the gradual 
elimination of the food rationing system. 
It is suggested that while these reforms point to the right direction, a successful reform 
of the agricultural sector might additionally require a redefinition of the power bases 
and relationships between the government and political stakeholders such as the 
bureaucracy and other groups (for example the civic society) by allowing participation 
of these stakeholders in the shaping of the reforms. This would not only reduce the 
opposition and blocking of the reforms, but would also avoid creating poverty and 
vulnerability among political losers and other groups that will not (at least initially) 
gain from the reform process. 
The dissertation concludes by presenting an outlook for research that includes the 
need to study the institutions and their impact on production for the highly diverse 
private producers, as well as the further study of household income and food security 
of the rural population. I also propose some changes in the activities of rural 
development organizations working in the country. For example, they might try to 
change the internal incentive problems in the state-dependent collective farms, and 
not only seek the collective farms’ improvement in production or marketing. 
Additionally, they could contribute by proposing alternative livelihoods for the 
political losers of reforms in the agricultural sector, such as the bureaucracy. 
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ZUSAMMENFASSUNG 
 
Obwohl Kuba immer noch eine Zentralverwaltungswirtschaft ist, wurden in den 
letzten Jahren durch die Staatsführung schrittweise marktwirtschaftliche Elemente in 
das Wirtschaftssystem integriert. Allerdings waren diese Veränderungen meist nicht 
weit reichend oder wurden nach einiger Zeit rückgängig gemacht; vor allem in der 
Landwirtschaft. In Folge der geringen Produktivität in der Landwirtschaft ist das Land 
auf Nahrungsmittelimporte angewiesen. Häufig werden technischer Rückstand, 
fehlende Ressourcen oder ungünstige Wetterbedingungen für die niedrige 
Produktivität verantwortlich gemacht. Die Betrachtung ökonomischer und politischer 
Institutionen als eine Mitursache für geringe Produktivitätsniveaus in der 
Landwirtschaft wird meist vernachlässigt. Hier setzt die vorliegende Arbeit an. 
Institutionen, welche Landbesitz, den Zugang zu Märkten und die rechtlichen 
Rahmenbedingungen für landwirtschaftliche Betriebe (Privat- oder Kollektivbetriebe) 
regulieren, beeinflussen die Produktion, da sie für Produzenten und andere 
ökonomische Akteure Anreize setzen aber auch Beschränkungen auferlegen. Darüber 
hinaus bietet eine Untersuchung der politischen und ökonomischen Institutionen 
Kubas einen Ansatzpunkt um die nur teilweise Umsetzung oder das Scheitern von 
Reformen im landwirtschaftlichen Sektor zu erörtern. Für einen (zu) langsamen 
Wandel von Institutionen oder das Scheitern der Reformen lassen sich verschiedene 
Ursachen anführen. Eine Ursache ist im Widerstand politischer Interessengruppen zu 
sehen. Diese Gruppen erwarten von Reformen eine Verringerung ihrer ökonomischen 
Renten oder ihres politischen Einflusses. 
Die vorliegende Arbeit untersucht die institutionellen Rahmenbedingungen für die 
Produktion und Vermarktung landwirtschaftlicher Güter in Kuba sowie den Einfluss 
dieser institutionellen Vorgaben auf die Produktionsmenge und die Bereitstellung von 
Nahrungsmitteln. Außerdem wird in dieser Dissertation das Zusammenwirken 
politischer und ökonomischer Kräfte, welche die institutionellen Veränderungen 
beeinflussen, analysiert. Diese Untersuchungen ermöglichen es, die 
Produktionsprobleme in der Landwirtschaft Kubas besser zu verstehen und 
Hindernisse zu identifizieren, welche die Implementierung erfolgreicher Institutionen 
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erschweren. Dabei geht es in dieser Arbeit nicht nur darum, einen ergänzenden 
Beitrag zu diesem bisher in der Literatur wenig behandelten Thema zu leisten. 
Vielmehr sollen mit dieser Arbeit auch politischen Entscheidungsträgern und 
Entwicklungshilfeorganisationen, welche im ländlichen Kuba aktiv sind, 
Informationen über die existierenden Probleme und mögliche Lösungswege 
bereitgestellt werden. 
Drei Forschungsarbeiten bilden die Grundlage für diese Dissertation. Die erste dieser 
Arbeiten untersucht die institutionellen Rahmenbedingungen des landwirtschaftlichen 
Sektors Kubas und die Auswirkungen der Institutionen auf die Leistungsfähigkeit 
unterschiedlicher Produzenten. In der zweiten Studie werden die Einflüsse dieser 
Institutionen auf die kollektive Produktion von Nahrungsmitteln, sowie die 
Nahrungsmittelverfügbarkeit und –sicherheit auf Haushaltsebene näher betrachtet. 
Diese Studie ist eine von nur zwei bekannten Arbeiten, welche Haushaltsausgaben in 
Kuba quantifizieren und die erste Arbeit, welche Häufigkeit und Vielfältigkeit im 
Nahrungsmittelkonsum im ländlichen Kuba untersucht. Die dritte Forschungsarbeit 
widmet sich den Reformen in der Landwirtschaft Kubas und untersucht diese vor dem 
Hintergrund existierender Theorien des institutionellen Wandels. Während 
Forschungsaufenthalten in Kuba von Oktober 2007 bis März 2008 und im April 2009 
wurden umfangreiche Daten erhoben, welche die Grundlagen für diese Dissertation 
bilden. Diese Primärdaten wurden durch Informationen aus offiziellen Statistiken 
sowie aus veröffentlichten und unveröffentlichten Forschungsarbeiten ergänzt. 
In der ersten Studie werden verschiedene Rinderproduzenten (private Unternehmen, 
staatsabhängige Kollektive und Staatsfarmen) vorgestellt und in Bezug auf ihren 
Zugang zu Land, zu Märkten für andere Produktionsfaktoren und Absatzwegen für 
erstellte Produkte, die gesetzlichen Vorgaben, welche die Rinderhaltung regeln, und 
ihren (betriebs-)wirtschaftlichen Erfolg verglichen. Dabei unterscheiden sich die drei 
wichtigsten Produzententypen in ihren Eigentumsrechten für Land und Rinder sowie 
ihrem Zugang zu illegalen Märkten. Für private Produzenten ergibt sich eine 
Bandbreite von Eigentumsrechten an Land und Rindern. Sie können Eigentümer sein, 
Nießbrauchrechte haben oder keinerlei Landrechte besitzen. Private Produzenten 
haben einen besseren Zugang zu illegalen Märkten unterliegen dabei aber dem Risiko 
dafür mit Strafzahlungen belegt, enteignet oder verhaftet zu werden. Auf illegalen 
Märkten lassen sich sehr viel höhere Preise erzielen als auf den legalen Märkten, auf 
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welchen Staatsfarmen und staatsabhängige Kollektive gezwungenermaßen ihre 
Produkte absetzen müssen. Staatsfarmen verfügen über keine Landbesitzrechte und 
staatsabhängige Kollektive üben lediglich Nießbrauchrechte aus. Staatsfarmen 
erwirtschaften neben Umsätzen aus ihrer eigenen Produktion auch Umsätze durch die 
administrative Kontrolle über andere Produzenten. Hingegen haben staatsabhängige 
Kollektive relativ wenig (Bestimmungs-)Rechte über das verbleibende Einkommen 
aus der betriebseigenen Rinderproduktion. Private Produzenten profitieren stärker 
vom Eigenverbrauch und Verkauf ihrer Produkte und sind die einzige 
Produzentengruppe, deren Herdengrößen in den letzten Jahren konstant angewachsen 
sind, und das trotz der höheren Risiken, mit denen sie konfrontiert sind. Ein weiteres 
Resultat ist, dass die sektorweite Effizienz in der Rinderproduktion rückläufig ist, da 
es an Mechanismen mangelt, die es erlauben würden, dass effizientere Produzenten 
ihre Produktion ausweiten und weniger effiziente Produzenten aus dem Markt 
ausscheiden. Sowohl die Produktionsausweitung (für private Unternehmen) als auch 
der Marktaustritt (für Kollektive and Staatsfarmen) sind verboten. Die Tatsache, dass 
zumindest eine der untersuchten Produzentenformen erfolgreich ist, lässt Zweifel 
aufkommen an der allgemein formulierten Ansicht, die Produktionsprobleme seien 
das Ergebnis technischer Rückständigkeit oder unzureichender Verfügbarkeit von 
Ressourcen. 
In der ersten Arbeit wurden die staatsabhängigen Kollektivbetriebe als flächenmäßig 
größte Produzenten identifiziert. Daher werden diese in der zweiten Arbeit näher 
untersucht. Mit Hilfe der Principal Component Analyse und anderer Methoden 
werden sowohl die kollektive landwirtschaftliche Produktion als auch Armut unter 
den landwirtschaftlichen Haushalten im Kollektiv und deren Zugang zu 
Nahrungsmitteln untersucht. Es zeigt sich, dass Unterschiede in der Qualität und 
Verfügbarkeit von Nahrungsmitteln welche nicht über das staatliche 
Nahrungsmittelrationierungssystem bezogen werden, sondern aus der individuellen 
oder kollektiven Eigenbedarfsproduktion stammen, entscheidend sind für die relative 
Armutssituation der untersuchten Haushalte und die Häufigkeit des Konsums 
bestimmter Nahrungsmittel. Zudem hängt die relative Armut eines Haushalts nicht 
von der ökonomischen Leistungsfähigkeit im Hauptproduktionszweig der 
Kollektivfarm (hier: Rindfleisch und Milch) ab. Diese Ergebnisse zeigen ebenso wie 
die Erkenntnisse, die aus eingehenden Interviews mit leitenden Angestellten und 
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Arbeitern der Kollektivfarmen gewonnen wurden, massive Anreizprobleme auf. In 
der kollektiven Produktion werden Arbeitskräfte nicht adäquat für den Einsatz ihrer 
Arbeitskraft im Hauptgeschäftszweig des Betriebes entlohnt. Die Milch- und 
Rindfleischproduktion der untersuchten Betriebe soll in das staatliche 
Nahrungsmittelzuteilungssystem einfließen. Daher beschränkt der Staat die private 
und kollektive Produktion von Nahrungsmitteln für den Eigenbedarf, da diese direkt 
mit der Produktion für das Rationierungssystem um Arbeitskräfte und anderen 
Ressourcen konkurriert. Durch diese Anreizprobleme wird die für die kubanische 
Bevölkerung im Rahmen des Nahrungsmittelzuteilungssystems zur Verfügung 
stehende Menge an Milch und Rindfleisch reduziert. Gleichzeitig wird durch diesen 
staatlichen „Schutz“ der Milch- und Rindfleischproduktion auch die 
Nahrungsmittelsicherheit der Arbeiter der Kollektivfarmen beeinträchtigt, da die 
Menge an Land, welche für die Eigenbedarfsproduktion von Nahrungsmitteln 
verfügbar ist, beschränkt ist. 
Es sind vielfältige Reformen notwendig um die Anreizprobleme, welche in den ersten 
beiden Studien identifiziert wurden, zu beheben. Es ist allerdings nicht klar, ob diese 
Reformen durchführbar sind. Dieser Fragestellung wird in der dritten Studie 
nachgegangen. In dieser Arbeit wird die Entwicklung der ökonomischen Institutionen 
in der kubanischen Landwirtschaft untersucht indem die historische Entwicklung des 
Zusammenspiels politischer Kräfte innerhalb des landwirtschaftlichen Sektors 
ausgewertet wird. Der Agrarsektor Kubas ist von Interessenkonflikten geprägt. Auf 
der einen Seite haben private Produzenten ein starkes Interesse an der Schaffung 
freier Märkte und der Zuweisung vollwertiger Landeigentumsrechte. Dem stehen die 
Interessen der politischen Elite und der Bürokratie gegenüber, da diese beiden 
Gruppen ihre Kontrolle über die landwirtschaftliche Produktion und Vermarktung 
erhalten wollen. In Krisenzeiten, in denen die Staatselite ihre Machtbasis gefährdet 
sah, wurden teilweise Eigentumsrechte an Land zugewiesen oder marktbasierte 
Anreizmechanismen für private Produzenten eingeführt. Allerdings wurden diese 
Reformen meist revidiert, sobald die Angst der Staatsführung oder die Unruhen 
abgeklungen waren, oder durch Scheinmaßnahmen ersetzt, welche die Konsumenten 
besänftigen sollten. Allerdings ist die Rücknahme von Reformen nicht nur Ausdruck 
des Verlangens der politischen Elite nach einem vorgesetzten Machterhalt sondern 
auch ein Ergebnis des politischen Widerstandes der von der Bürokratie des Landes 
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ausgeht. Die Bürokraten blockieren oder verzögern die Umsetzung von Reformen, 
sobald sie ihre politischen Einflussmöglichkeiten oder zukünftige ökonomische 
Renten gefährdet sehen. Wenn Institutionen eingeführt werden, welche die Effizienz 
der landwirtschaftlichen Produktion steigern würden, dann würde dies die Macht der 
privaten Produzenten steigern. Politische Macht würde dann anderen und neu 
entstehenden Interessengruppen, wie den Arbeitern der staatsabhängigen 
Kollektivfarmen, zukommen. Diese Machtumverteilung ginge auf Kosten der 
Bürokraten in den Staatsfarmen und in den staatlichen Verteilungszentren für 
landwirtschaftliche Produkte und Nahrungsmittel. Die seit 2007 angekündigten 
Reformen deuten auf eine Strategie, welche darauf abzielt, den Einfluss der 
Bürokratie zu mindern. Dies zeigt sich in Massenentlassungen von Bürokraten, der 
Abschaffung oder Verschmelzung von Staatsfarmen und anderen Staatsbetrieben und 
der schrittweisen Abschaffung des Nahrungsmittelzuteilungssystems. 
Eine Empfehlung auf Basis der vorliegenden Arbeit ist, dass es für eine erfolgreiche 
Reformierung des landwirtschaftlichen Sektors einer Neudefinition der Machtbasis 
und der Beziehungen zwischen der Regierung und politischen Interessgruppen wie 
den Bürokraten und anderen Gruppen (zum Beispiel die Zivilgesellschaft) bedarf, 
wobei den Interessengruppen die Möglichkeit zur Mitarbeit an der Ausgestaltung von 
Reformen gewährt werden muss. 
Am Ende der Dissertation wird ein Ausblick auf Ansatzpunkte für weitere 
Forschungen gegeben. Es erscheint notwendig, das institutionelle Gefüge, welchem 
private Produzenten unterliegen, genauer zu analysieren und dabei die Auswirkungen 
dieser Institutionen auf die Produktion zu untersuchen. Außerdem erscheint es 
angeraten weitere Studien durchzuführen, um das Haushaltseinkommen und die 
Nahrungsmittelsicherheit der ländlichen Bevölkerung zu analysieren. Zudem zeige ich 
mögliche Ansatzpunkte für Veränderungen in der Arbeitsweise von bereits im Land 
aktiven und auf den ländlichen Raum fokussierten Entwicklungsorganisationen auf. 
Sie könnten zum Beispiel versuchen, die Anreizprobleme innerhalb der 
staatsabhängigen Kollektivbetriebe zu lösen und sich damit nicht nur darauf 
beschränken, die Produktions- und Vermarktungsabläufe der Betriebe zu verbessern. 
Zusätzlich könnten die Entwicklungsorganisationen für die politischen Verlierer von 
Reformen, zum Beispiel die Bürokraten, Alternativen zur Sicherung ihres 
Lebensunterhalts aufzeigen. 
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RESUMEN EJECUTIVO 
 
Cuba es un país con una economía planificada centralmente que ha introducido 
cambios graduales hacia una economía de mercado. Sin embargo, muchos de estos 
cambios son parciales o se han revertido, particularmente en el sector agropecuario. El 
país depende de la importación de alimentos como resultado de la baja productividad 
agropecuaria, de la cual se ha dicho que es el resultado de deficiencias técnicas, falta 
de recursos y perturbaciones climáticas. Esta disertación, sin embargo, se enfoca en el 
papel que juegan las instituciones económicas y políticas en los problemas 
productivos. Las instituciones económicas que gobiernan el uso de la tierra, el acceso 
a los mercados y la organización de las unidades productivas (por ejemplo, de forma 
colectiva o familiar) tienen un impacto sobre la producción, ya que ellas determinan 
los incentivos y las restricciones a los que se enfrentan tanto los productores como 
otros actores en la cadena productiva. Adicionalmente, el estudio de las instituciones 
políticas y económicas del sector agropecuario de Cuba puede ayudar a dilucidar la 
razones por las cuales dicho sector no ha sido reformado exitosamente. Las 
instituciones cambian lentamente o permanecen estables por diversas razones, 
incluyendo la oposición política de actores que temen perder ventajas económicas o 
su capital político como resultado de la implementación de reformas. 
Esta disertación tiene como objetivos entender los problemas productivos de la 
agricultura Cubana y evaluar los obstáculos que el país enfrenta al intentar 
implementar reformas exitosas. Con este fin se estudió el marco institucional que 
gobierna la producción y comercialización agrícola en Cuba, su impacto en la 
producción y el suministro de alimentos, y las dinámicas políticas y económicas que 
han impulsado su evolución. Los objetivos de la disertación no se limitan a contribuir 
a reducir la falta de publicaciones sobre el tema, sino que está dirigida a informar a 
los responsables de las políticas agrarias del país, así como a organizaciones de 
desarrollo rural que trabajan allí. 
Este trabajo está organizado alrededor de tres artículos de investigación. El primer 
artículo aborda el marco institucional del sector agropecuario cubano y su impacto en 
el desempeño de distintos tipos de productores. El segundo artículo explora con más 
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detalle el impacto de estas instituciones en la producción de colectivos agrícolas, así 
como en la disponibilidad de alimentos y seguridad alimentaria a nivel de hogares. 
Este estudio es uno de los dos únicos análisis publicados que cuantifican los gastos de 
hogares cubanos, y el primero que estudia la frecuencia y diversidad en el consumo de 
alimentos en los hogares de las zonas rurales del país. En el tercer artículo se analizan 
las reformas del sector agropecuario cubano usando teorías de cambio institucional. 
La información primaria utilizada en esta disertación se recolectó durante dos estadías 
de investigación (Octubre 2007-Marzo 2008, y Abril 2009), y fue complementada con 
reportes estadísticos oficiales, así como publicaciones y manuscritos sin publicar.  
El primer artículo presenta y compara los distintos tipos de productores de ganadería 
vacuna (productores privados, colectivos dependientes del estado y granjas estatales) 
en cuanto a su acceso a la tierra, a mercados de insumos productivos y de productos 
agrícolas, la legislación que regula la cría de su ganado, y su desempeño. Los tres 
tipos principales de productores difieren en los derechos que poseen sobre la tierra y 
el ganado, así como su acceso a mercados ilegales. Los productores privados tienen 
diferentes grados de derechos sobre sus tierras y ganado que varían desde propietarios 
hasta usufructuarios y sin acceso a la tierra. Además tienen mejor acceso a los 
mercados ilegales pero a riesgo de ser multados, sufrir confiscaciones de sus 
propiedades, o cumplir largas condenas de cárcel. Los mercados ilegales ofrecen 
precios muy superiores en comparación a los mercados oficiales a dónde están 
obligados a concurrir las granjas estatales y los productores colectivos dependientes 
del estado. Las granjas estatales no tienen ningún derecho sobre la tierra y sus 
ingresos económicos se derivan del control administrativo de otros productores, y no 
de su propia producción pecuaria. Las fincas colectivas dependientes del estado tienen 
derechos de usufructo sobre la tierra, pero tienen derechos muy limitados sobre los 
ingresos residuales de las actividades ganaderas. Los productores privados obtienen 
más beneficios del consumo y ventas provenientes de su producción y, a pesar de 
sufrir riesgos elevados, son los únicos que han logrado incrementar el tamaño de sus 
rebaños vacunos en los últimos años. Adicionalmente, en este estudio se encontró que 
no existen mecanismos para abandonar o ingresar a esta actividad productiva, lo que 
resulta en una disminución general de la eficiencia del sector al evitarse que los 
mejores productores entren o aumenten su producción, y a la vez evitar que los peores 
productores se retiren. Las ideas prevalecientes sobre las causas de la baja producción 
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ganadera en Cuba se centran en deficiencias técnicas o falta de recursos. Sin embargo, 
el hecho de que al menos uno de los tipos de productores estudiados sea exitoso en 
cuanto a la producción pecuaria, pone en duda estas causas. 
El segundo artículo estudia con más detalles a los productores que ocupan la mayor 
parte del área agrícola del país, y que fueron descritos en el primer artículo: las fincas 
colectivas dependientes del estado. Este estudio explora la producción colectiva, así 
como la pobreza y el acceso a alimentos de los hogares de estas fincas colectivas. Para 
esto se utiliza, entre otros, el análisis de componentes principales. La pobreza relativa 
y la diversidad de alimentos que consumen los hogares estudiados se caracterizan por 
las diferencias en la calidad y frecuencia de consumo de los alimentos que no son 
suministrados a través de la cartilla de racionamiento estatal, sino que por el contrario 
provienen de producción tanto colectiva como individual para autoconsumo. Por otra 
parte, el estatus de pobreza relativa de los hogares no se corresponde con el 
desempeño económico ni productivo en cuanto a leche y carne vacuna de las fincas 
colectivas a las que pertenecen. Estos resultados, sumados a la información obtenida 
de entrevistas a profundidad con administradores y trabajadores de estas fincas, 
exponen problemas severos en el régimen de incentivos de las fincas colectivas. Los 
trabajadores no reciben ninguna recompensa o beneficio por su trabajo en las 
actividades ganaderas de sus fincas colectivas. Al mismo tiempo, el estado restringe la 
producción tanto colectiva como familiar de alimentos para autoconsumo, ya que 
estas actividades compiten por mano de obra y recursos con la producción colectiva 
de carne vacuna y leche destinados al sistema de racionamiento estatal. Los 
problemas de incentivos lastiman el suministro de leche y carne vacuna que debería 
llegar a la población cubana a través de la cartilla de racionamiento. Adicionalmente, 
al restringir el estado la cantidad de tierras que pueden usar los trabajadores de las 
fincas colectivas para la producción de alimentos para el consumo de sus familias con 
el fin de “proteger” la producción de leche y carne vacuna, se pone en peligro la 
seguridad alimentaria de estas familias. 
Se requieren ciertas reformas para corregir los problemas de incentivos identificados 
en los dos primeros artículos, sin embargo, no está claro si dichas reformas son 
posibles. El tercer artículo trata de responder esta pregunta explorando la evolución de 
las instituciones económicas del sector agropecuario de Cuba mediante el estudio de 
la dinámica histórica entre poderes políticos en el sector. El sector agropecuario 
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cubano está marcado por constantes conflictos entre los productores privados, 
definidos por su fuerte interés por el establecimiento de mercados libres y derechos de 
propiedad completos sobre sus tierras, y otros actores que tienen intereses opuestos, 
tales como la élite política y los burócratas que controlan la producción y 
comercialización agrícola del país. Cuba sólo ha adoptado un régimen de derechos 
sobre la tierra e incentivos de mercado para productores de forma parcial y 
exclusivamente durante crisis extremas que han amenazado la permanencia en el 
poder de la élite. Por otra parte, una vez que se reducen las amenazas a la élite, las 
reformas se revierten y se aplican soluciones alternativas para aplacar a los 
consumidores.  La revocación de las reformas, sin embargo, también resulta de la 
oposición política de burócratas que bloquean o retrasan la implementación de 
reformas cada vez que éstas amenazan su capital político o sus ganancias futuras. La 
adopción de instituciones que resulten en una agricultura más eficiente aumentaría el 
poder de los productores privados y le daría poder político a grupos nuevos o 
emergentes; por ejemplo, a los trabajadores de fincas colectivas dependientes del 
estado. Esta redistribución del poder político ocurriría a expensas de la burocracia de 
fincas, empresas agrícolas y de distribución de alimentos del estado. Las reformas 
anunciadas desde el año 2007 en Cuba parecen buscar limitar la influencia de la 
burocracia a través de despidos masivos, la eliminación o fusión de fincas y empresas 
estatales, y la gradual eliminación del sistema de racionamiento de alimentos. 
Se sugiere que, a pesar de que estas reformas parecen apuntar a la dirección correcta, 
su implementación exitosa en el sector agrícola puede requerir adicionalmente un 
redefinición de las bases de poder y las relaciones entre la élite política y otras partes 
interesadas, tales como la burocracia y otros grupos (por ejemplo, la sociedad civil). 
Esta redefinición de las relaciones entre los actores podría incluir la participación de 
todos los grupos en el diseño de las políticas a implementar. Esto no solo tiene el 
potencial de reducir la oposición y el bloqueo de las reformas, sino que también 
evitaría la creación de pobreza y vulnerabilidad entre los perdedores políticos y otros 
grupos que, al menos en un principio, no ganen con el proceso de reforma. 
La disertación concluye con la presentación de perspectivas para la investigación de 
varios temas, incluyendo la necesidad de estudiar más a fondo las instituciones y su 
impacto sobre la producción de los distintos tipos de productores privados. También 
se definen algunos temas de interés relacionados al ingreso familiar y seguridad 
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alimentaria de hogares rurales en Cuba. En esta última sección, también se proponen 
cambios en las actividades de las organizaciones de desarrollo rural que trabajan en el 
país. Por ejemplo, estas organizaciones podrían intentar mejorar los incentivos de 
trabajo al interior de las fincas colectivas, en vez de concentrarse únicamente en el 
aumento de la producción y comercialización de estas unidades. Asimismo, podrían 
contribuir a los procesos de cambio mediante propuestas referidas a medios de vida 
alternativos para los grupos que pierdan durante las reformas, tales como la 
burocracia. 
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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
 
Cuba has a centrally planned economy that introduced gradual changes towards a 
market economy in certain sectors – including agriculture – following the collapse of 
the Soviet Union and the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance in the early 1990s 
(Xianglin 2007). The country’s agricultural sector is characterized by low 
productivity, and therefore Cuba depends on costly imports in order to feed its 
population (Mesa Lago 2008). Problems of the agricultural sector not only affect 
Cuba’s balance of payments, but also have important impacts on the food security of 
the population, as food access remains one of the unsolved challenges of the country 
(Brundenius 2009; Mesa Lago 2008). The worsening agricultural production and 
soaring world food prices have recently led to renewed efforts by the state to reform 
its agricultural sector (Peters 2009). So far the reforms introduced in the 1990s and in 
2007-2008 have failed. Production in most subsectors has decreased as compared to 
pre-crisis levels, except for roots and tubers that have doubled (Mesa Lago 2008; 
Nova Gonzalez 2010; ONE 2010). 
Technical and infrastructure deficiencies, lack of resources and climatic disturbances 
have been frequently blamed for the low production in Cuba, although it is also 
recognized that organizational problems and inadequate legislation generate 
inefficient production and distribution of food (Alvarez 2004; Funes-Monzote 2008; 
Nova Gonzalez 2008; Pavó Acosta 2003). While there are certainly technical and 
resource problems, such as outdated machinery, lack of spare parts, fuel and mineral 
inputs, as well as land degradation (Funes-Monzote 2008; González 2003; Wezel and 
Bender 2002), I chose to focus on a less explored dimension of Cuba’s agricultural 
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sector. This dissertation aims to analyze the institutional framework that governs 
agricultural production and marketing, as well as its evolution and failure to provide 
sufficient incentives for a productive sector able to feed Cuba’s population and realize 
its large potential for agricultural exports. 
Food and agricultural production depend on the institutions governing land use, rural 
labour markets and access to agricultural commodity and credit markets, as these 
determine the incentives and constraints faced by producers, distributors and other 
economic actors. For example, lack of rural land markets or insecurity of land tenure 
can lead to low investments in agricultural production and resource misuse that 
negatively affects production (Deininger and Songqing Jin 2003; Markussen 2008; 
Schlager and Ostrom 1992). Moreover, collectively owned or managed production 
entities, such as the ones common in Cuba,  have been shown in other countries to 
have incentive and monitoring problems that result in inefficient use of labour and 
low agricultural output (Lerman et al. 2003). The institutional framework governing 
Cuba’s agricultural sector and its impact on productive performance has been little 
explored in the literature. It has been shown, for example, that state intervention is 
related to lower productivity (Alvarez and Puerta 1994), and that the brief 
introduction of free markets for agricultural produce in the 1980s caused a significant 
increase in agricultural output (Deere and Meurs 1992). The study of the impact of 
economic institutions on different actors in Cuba may additionally bring light on the 
question of why or how these institutions change or do not change. Institutions evolve 
slowly in part because changing them is costly and path-dependent, but also because 
of political opposition from actors that bear most of the costs or that expect their 
economic returns and their political capital to decrease as a result of reforms 
(Acemoglu et al. 2004; Acemoglu and Robinson 2008; Rozelle and Swinnen 2009). 
This dissertation seeks not only to cover some of the insufficiencies in the literature 
related to the institutions governing Cuba’s agricultural sector, their impact on 
production, and the constraints to their evolution, but I also have the objective of 
informing policy makers and especially rural development organizations working in 
the country. The main research questions that I seek to answer in this dissertation are:  
- Which institutions govern the use of land and production resources, and the 
access to agricultural commodity markets in Cuban agriculture? 
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- What problems are these institutions causing in terms of agricultural 
production, food availability and food security in Cuba? 
- Why do implemented reforms either are reversed or fail to improve the output 
and productivity of the agricultural sector of Cuba? 
Data collection for the dissertation was carried out while establishing a baseline study 
for a rural development project implemented by the German NGO Welthungerhilfe 
and the Cuban Association of Animal Production (ACPA), and co-financed by Dutch 
NGO Hivos. This rural development project, as well as others observed during data 
collection, will be used as an example in the final discussion of this dissertation, in 
order to consider strategies to improve agricultural production and living standards in 
Cuba. The main objectives of the rural development project mentioned above are to 
improve the living standard of members of collective farms and smallholders by 
increasing their agricultural production and productivity, and identifying alternative 
marketing options. The project targets collective and private producers of the cattle 
production sector in the eastern provinces of Cuba. Project activities include training 
in business management and planning, and the competitive financing of business 
plans designed by the beneficiaries (Deutsche Welthungerhilfe 2005). The strategy of 
the NGO Welthungerhilfe seems to centre on training in “farming economically” as a 
way to facilitate the transition from a centrally planned economy to a market oriented 
one, especially for the collective farms (Gaese and Preuss 2001). 
The dissertation is organized around three papers: the first two research questions are 
studied from different angles in the first and second papers (Chapter 2 and 3), while 
the reforms of Cuba’s agricultural sector are dealt with in the third paper (Chapter 4). 
The key hypotheses I test and the approach used in each of these papers are: 
H1.- The institutional framework of Cuba’s agricultural sector causes 
overall low production. Moreover, the three producer types are 
governed by dissimilar sets of institutions that result in differences in 
terms of production and economic success.  
The cattle sector was chosen in order to test the first hypothesis, as it supplies the 
rationed food distribution system and is one of the most problematic sectors in Cuba. 
The first paper (Chapter 2) presents and compares different producer types (private 
producers, state-dependent collectives and state farms), their access to land and 
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agricultural input and output markets, the legislation governing their cattle husbandry, 
and their performance. The data used for this paper was compiled from published and 
unpublished studies, official statistics, and a quantitative and qualitative study of 
state-dependent collectives carried out in two field research stays: the first one from 
October 2007 to March 2008, and the second one during April 2009. 
This study did not include other production sectors in Cuba, but several of them share 
some characteristics with the cattle sector. For example, similarly to the constraints 
faced by cattle producers, the producers of rice, citric fruits and potato are not allowed 
to sell their products in markets, but must turn them in full to the state. On the other 
hand, producers of small livestock and other crops can participate in free markets after 
honouring state quotas (Nova Gonzalez 2008).  
 H2.- The institutional framework governing agricultural production in 
Cuba causes food security problems in the households of collective 
producers and at national level by negatively affecting food production.  
To test the second hypothesis, the largest producer type in the agricultural sector in 
terms of land will be explored in greater detail. The second paper (Chapter 3) deals 
with the poverty and food security status of the households of state-dependent 
collective farm workers, and the relationship they have with collective agricultural 
production and the economic performance of their collective farms. This study uses 
principal component analysis (PCA) to separate households in relative poverty groups 
and compare indicators of food security, as well as the food sources between these 
groups. The relative poverty index is explored for relationships with collective 
agricultural production for worker consumption and for the supply of the national 
food rationing system. The primary data on households and collective farms used in 
this chapter was collected by me during the two research stays in Cuba. 
Neither private farmers nor state farm workers are included in this study because I did 
not gain permission to contact these groups. The study of poverty, food security, and 
agricultural production in these two groups remains therefore a largely unexplored 
topic for future highly policy-relevant research. Household level studies are infrequent 
in Cuba and the rural areas are particularly underrepresented in the literature, with 
only a handful of studies focusing on farm or household level published so far, and 
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none of them from representative sample surveys (see, for example: Deere et al. 1995; 
Enríquez 2003; Leyva Remón 2006; Wezel and Bender 2002). 
H3.- Present day institutions in Cuba’s agricultural sector are the result 
of conflicts between different actors: the political elite, bureaucrats that 
control production and input-output markets, consumers, and private 
agricultural producers. 
To test the third hypothesis, the last paper investigates the evolution of the agricultural 
policies in Cuba by separating the last 50 years in four periods used as case studies. 
This paper (Chapter 4) deals with the political conflicts and the economic institutions 
which result from these conflicts in each period, and identifies the obstacles 
encountered when trying to implement reforms towards a more efficient agriculture. 
The study uses the rich literature on policy changes in Cuba’s agricultural sector, 
newspaper articles from dissident and official sources, and observations and 
interviews with the different actors carried out during field trips to the country. 
The dissertation is organized as follows. The results will be presented in the form of 
the three individual papers mentioned before. Chapter 2 deals with the institutions of 
cattle production and marketing. After the reader has a general idea of which are the 
main producer types in Cuba, Chapter 3 will focus on the largest group, the state-
dependent collective farms. Subsequently, Chapter 4 deals with the evolution of the 
agricultural sector. The dissertation will then wrap up in Chapter 5 with a discussion 
of the main results and outlook for research and development aid. 
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CHAPTER 2.  
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Abstract: The decrease of production in Cuba’s cattle sector has been blamed on 
technical factors, overlooking the role of the institutional setup of the sector. The 
objectives of the paper are to describe the sector’s institutional framework and to 
compare the performance of different producer types. The three main producer types 
differ in their access to illegal markets, in the property right structure for land and 
cattle, and in their economic and productive success. The fact that at least one of the 
producer types is successful casts doubt on the prevailing idea that production 
problems are a result of technical problems. It is discussed that the incomplete and 
insecure property rights regime in Cuba results in an low productivity caused by 
incentive and other problems. 
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Introduction 
The agricultural sector is one of Cuba’s greatest challenges as the costs of importing 
food increase, while national food production stagnates or even is reduced. Cuba 
imports more than $1.5 billion (US) per year of food, but about 50% of the 
agricultural land is not used and it is believed that most of these imports could be 
substituted by local production (Alvarez 2004; Nova Gonzalez 2008b; ONE 2008a; 
ONE 2009a). In the cattle sub sector, herd numbers have steadily decreased in the last 
years. In the same period, total production and production per head have stagnated 
and even decreased. The decrease has been mainly blamed on technical variables - the 
lack of production inputs, medicine and decaying infrastructure - but organizational 
problems in the state and collective sectors, as well as an inappropriate legislation 
body have also been named as probable causes (Alvarez 2004; Funes-Monzote 2008; 
Nova Gonzalez 2008c; Pavó Acosta 2003). 
Livestock production has traditionally been important for the island’s 
economy, especially for domestic consumption (García Álvarez 2003; Nova Gonzalez 
2008e). The cattle sector is governed by a number of sector-specific laws and is a 
politically sensitive topic for the population and the state. The functionality of the 
cattle sector has not been studied in international journals, and Cuban researchers 
have only explored a small part of its socio-economic and organizational 
characteristics. Most of the research deals with technical aspects of pasture and 
livestock management (Benítez et al. 2002; Benítez et al. 2008; Funes-Monzote et al. 
2009), while less attention is given to managerial, organizational and socio-economic 
characteristics of producer types (Borroto et al. 2006; Cruz et al. 1999; González et 
al. 2003; Nova Gonzalez 2008a; Suárez et al. 2007), or to the legal aspects related to 
cattle tenure and criminality (Pavó Acosta 2003; Pavó Acosta undated). 
The lack of publications in the detailed organization and institutional 
arrangements of Cuban cattle sector prevents a complete understanding of the reasons 
behind its production problems. Economic performance is closely related to that of the 
institutions as they determine the incentives and constraints faced by economic actors. 
The institutional environment at macro-level and the institutional arrangements at 
micro-level determine the property rights structure as well as the organization and 
functioning of economic actors (Mercuro and Medema 1997). The property rights 
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structure, for example, has been shown to be closely related to agricultural 
productivity (Alston and Mueller 2005; Markussen 2008). 
This study presents an overview of the cattle sector in Cuba, describing land 
and cattle tenure regimes, producer types and the organization of marketing for beef 
and milk, as well as some of the legal aspects related to cattle production and 
consumption. It also compares, as far as possible, the different producer types in terms 
of the institutions that control their production and marketing, as well as the results of 
these institutions in terms of organization, access to markets and productive 
performance. The paper is organised as follows: The first part describes the 
organization of cattle production and marketing, including some of the legal 
regulations specific to the sector. Subsequently, the performance of cattle’s main 
producer types will be compared. The information presented in the preceding sections 
will then be discussed in terms of the underlying institutional framework of the cattle 
sector and its possible impact on the performance of the different producer types 
analyzed. 
The data used in this research is compiled from a range of published and 
unpublished studies and a survey of state dependent cooperatives carried out by the 
authors. The primary information used regarding the state dependent cooperatives 
called UBPC (Basic Units of Cooperative Production), was collected by the authors 
from October 2007 to March 2008 in three provinces in Eastern Cuba. Data was 
collected using different qualitative and quantitative research methodologies, ranging 
from observation and participant observation to structured and semi-structured 
interviews. In addition, standardised questionnaires were completed at 30 cattle 
UBPC farms. Actors at different stages of the production chain were interviewed, 
including additional cooperative farms, employees of state agricultural enterprises, as 
well as experts and key informants in the sector. 
Organization of Cuba’s cattle sector 
Cuba’s cattle sector is complex, having a range of different proprietor types, only one 
approved state marketing channel, and a lively illegal market. Sector specific laws, 
sometimes even presenting differences between producer types, strictly regulate 
production, breeding, transport, consumption and marketing.  This section details the 
most important aspects of the sector, and compares the different producer types. 
12                                          Chapter 2. Legal regulations and agricultural production 
Land and cattle proprietor and tenant types 
There are three legally recognised land property types in Cuba: land belonging to the 
state, to agricultural cooperatives and to small farmers. Private individuals and 
cooperatives (or collectives) can also have usufruct rights over state land. The right to 
sell or rent the land is considered a prerogative exclusive to the state (Pavó Acosta 
2008). Cattle can be owned by the state, individuals and cooperatives, and these last 
two can also keep state owned cattle (Pavó Acosta undated). 
The diversity of land and cattle property and usufruct regimes result in a 
number of producer types. In the case of beef and milk production, we find farms 
belonging to the state, two types of collectives (the first one is the private 
Cooperatives of Agricultural Production CPA while the UBPC has state land in 
usufruct and is tightly controlled by it), and individual producers either organised in 
credit and service cooperatives (CCS) or dispersed. Landless ownership of cattle is 
legally restricted but not forbidden (Pavó Acosta undated). However, landless owners 
are not mentioned separately in official statistics, so it is difficult to ascertain their 
importance in terms of number of producers or of cattle heads owned. Cattle 
producers can be broadly separated in three main types: state producers, UBPC or 
state dependent collectives, and private farmers that include CPA, CCS, landless and 
dispersed (see Table 1).  
The state producers include farms and livestock enterprises, which besides 
from production also have additional responsibilities as service and input providers. 
Workers in these farms are public employees that obtain a salary but are not entitled 
to make any kind of decisions over production or salary. The UBPC farms, on the 
other hand, are semi-independent from the state. Workers in these collectives are, 
according to legislation, “owners of their production” (Decree-Law Nr. 142 1993). 
This ownership is translated in their right to reap benefits from their farm by receiving 
a part of the total annual revenues. Nevertheless, the state decides what, when and 
how much will be produced by the collective, and restricts their marketing options. 
Official statistics and other studies place UBPC together with private producers in the 
non-state sector (ONE 2009a; Álvarez Licea 2001), but differences in their 
organization, the legal body regulating their functioning and their lack of 
independence from the state call for their separate analysis. 
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Table 1: Main cattle producer types in Cuba and their land and cattle tenure regimes. 
Producer type Examples /Name Land tenure Cattle tenure 
State State farms, livestock 
enterprises, military 
farms 
State State 
State dependent 
collectives 
UBPC: Basic units of 
cooperative production 
State land in 
usufruct 
Private, owned 
collectively 
CPA: Cooperatives of 
agricultural production 
Private, owned 
collectively 
Private, owned 
collectively 
CCS: Credit and service 
cooperatives 
Private, owned 
individually, or 
state land in 
usufruct 
Private, owned 
individually 
Dispersed farmers Private, owned 
individually, or 
state land in 
usufruct 
Private, owned 
individually 
Private 
Landless cattle owners No land Private, owned 
individually 
 
The private producers are very heterogeneous but share a number of 
characteristics that differentiate them from the state and UBPC producers. Private 
producers have a higher independence regarding production and marketing decisions, 
and participate more in agricultural markets (ONE 2008c; ONE 2009c). Moreover, 
there exists some form of inheritance in all subtypes. For example, land, livestock and 
productive assets can be inherited (with certain restrictions) to surviving spouses and 
family members of individual producers and members of CCS cooperatives (Decree-
Law Nr. 125 1991; Pavó Acosta 2008). CPA collectives are somewhat different. They 
were formed when private individual farmers joined their land during collectivization 
campaigns at the end of the decade of 1970 (Kay 1988; Nova Gonzalez 2008d; 
14                                          Chapter 2. Legal regulations and agricultural production 
Álvarez Licea 2001). In the case of the death of a CPA member, inheritance rules 
dictate that surviving family and spouses are entitled to receive outstanding payments 
related to the contributed assets and land, any pending utilities or advance payments, 
and a pension (Law Nr. 95 2002;  Decree-Law Nr. 217 2001).  
Another key difference between the private producers and the state or UBPC 
producers, is that they are controlled (or represented) by different organizations. State 
and UBPC farms respond directly to the Ministry of Sugar (in the case of farms that 
previously produced sugarcane, but have been transformed into cattle farms) or the 
Ministry of Agriculture. On the other hand, even if private CPA and CCS also have to 
respond to the ministries and follow their policies, they have an additional 
organization that represents them. The National Association of Small Farmers 
(ANAP) provides extension and other services to its members, including channelling 
state credits. The president of ANAP is a member of the Council of State of Cuba 
(Granma 2008), and thus is part of the highest levels of the island’s political power. 
There is some evidence that the ANAP not only represents the producers before the 
state but also helps the Ministry of Agriculture in controlling them, for example by 
enforcing laws and regulations (Jordán Morales and Lugo Fonte 1994).  
UBPC producers have proposed for a similar organization to unite and 
represent them but have not been allowed to do it by the Ministry of Agriculture, as 
was evident at a meeting witnessed in Santiago de Cuba province on February 06, 
2008. The observed meeting was attended by the directives of a leading UBPC of the 
cattle sector and representatives of the Ministry of Agriculture, including the Vice-
Minister for Cooperatives Mr. Alcides López Labrada, as well as province and local 
level officials.  
Dispersed and landless cattle producers are different from other private 
producers in that they are not associated with ANAP. The same inheritance rules 
mentioned before apply for the land of dispersed farmers, but are not clear for cattle 
owned by landless producers. Landless producers are interesting but there is very little 
information regarding them. A look at laws and anecdotic information suggests that 
the state has tried to control them by restricting the maximum allowed number of 
cattle and horses they may have (Decree Nr. 225 1997;  Resolution Nr. 5 2003), but 
they have only recently been offered land to increase their production (Decree-Law 
Nr. 259 2008).  
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In the Figure 1 it can be seen that private owners had 55% of the total cattle 
heads at the end of 2008, while the UBPC and state farms had 19% and 26% each. 
These numbers contrast with the distribution of agricultural land among the different 
producers, where the UBPC occupy almost 40% of the land, and the private farmers 
only 33% (ONE 2009a).  
 
Figure 1. Agricultural land and cattle ownership for different producer types in Cuba, 
in percentage of the total as of December 2008 (ONE 2009a). 
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Cattle production systems 
Cattle production systems in Cuba vary between the different producer types. State 
and UBPC producers have large farms with extensive and frequently low input 
systems, while private producers have smaller areas with more intensive and 
diversified systems (Funes-Monzote 2008). 
The cattle producing units from state farms have been under different 
production technologies since the revolution of 1959. During the first decades of the 
revolutionary government, the agricultural production model implemented was based 
on large scale, highly specialised and mechanised state farms, with intensive use of 
imported chemical inputs and feed concentrates (Funes-Monzote 2008; Kay 1988). 
This agriculture model was impossible to maintain with the collapse of the Soviet 
Union and the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance in the early 1990s. The 
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Cuban response was to decrease the average size of production units by breaking up 
many of the state farms and transforming them into the UBPC, and to find alternatives 
to the inputs previously imported (Alvarez 2004; Funes-Monzote et al. 2009; Funes-
Monzote 2008). However, it is considered that the size of the newly formed UBPC 
cooperatives remained too large in the cattle sector, thus reducing their potential 
production efficiency. Private cattle collectives (CPA) were considered more efficient 
and had smaller average areas as compared to the cattle UBPC collectives in the year 
1994 (Funes-Monzote 2008). The situation has not changed much during the first 15 
years since the reforms. In the case of the surveyed UBPC, the average size of the 
farms was around 1.345 Ha, but varied from just over 350 Ha to almost 3.500 Ha. The 
reported size of the UBPC farms is misleading, though. Unused land accounts for a 
relatively large percentage of total area in the UBPC farms as a result of 
abandonment, invasion by weeds or even encroaching by the population (González et 
al. 2003). According to official statistics, this problem is even more pronounced in the 
state sector (ONE 2009a). 
On comparison, private individual farms are seldom bigger than 67 Ha since 
the second law of Agrarian Reform in 1963 expropriated most of the farms above this 
limit. Additionally, land titles of maximum 28 Ha were given to landless farmers 
during the first years of the revolution (Alvarez 2004; Pavó Acosta 2008). Some 
published case studies in the private sector point to farms no bigger than 27 Ha in 
Habana province (Iraola et al. 2007), while farms of up to 67 Ha have been reported 
in areas of Guantánamo province, with averages of between 9,5 Ha, and 27 Ha in 
different villages (Wezel and Bender 2002; Wezel and Bender 2004). There are no 
data regarding the use of private land, but anecdotic evidence suggests that these 
percentages are much smaller than in the UBPC or state farms. Moreover, some 
publications suggest that the private producers overuse their resources instead of 
under using them (Funes-Monzote 2008; Iraola et al. 2007). The few published 
studies dealing with this producer type shows that of the total farm area, only a 
percentage of these private farm consists of pastures, ranging from 13 to 59% in 
Habana province (Iraola et al. 2007) while in Guantánamo province, only a limited 
number of the farmers have pastures while others (specially in the arid areas) use 
common land to graze. 
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In the UBPC cooperatives studied, cattle production is by far the most 
important activity, and therefore pastures constitute the majority of the total area. 
These areas are mostly low productivity natural pastures, usually not separated in 
paddocks. According to interviews, the lack of wire and poles restricts the correct 
management of the pastures. A few of the interviewed collectives have more intensive 
use of land with improved pastures, protein banks, and different methods of rotational 
grazing. On the contrary, the private farms use far less percentage of their farms for 
pastures and seem to have a much more diversified farm. Many private and landless 
farmers use state land to graze their animals. The stocking rates of private pastures are 
much higher than the ones in the UBPC or state sector (Iraola et al. 2007; Wezel and 
Bender 2002; Wezel and Bender 2004). These results seem to suggest very different 
production systems, with a more diversified use of land on the side of the private 
farmers. Use of additional feed is not common in any of the producer types, as the 
cost for importing them is too high and there are few national suppliers (Nova 
Gonzalez and García Álvarez 2002). 
Marketing of cattle and cattle products 
Cuban laws and regulations for cattle and agricultural production greatly restrict how 
products are marketed. Food is distributed to the population via ration cards that 
depend on a highly inefficient system of collection and distribution, called Acopio 
(Alvarez 2004; Nova Gonzalez 2008a). Several products, such as fruits, vegetables, 
and tubers, can be bought in agricultural markets. Beef and milk sales are strictly 
prohibited for entities other than the state and are limited to certain demographic 
groups, such as children, the sick and pregnant women. Nevertheless, beef is also 
distributed to state-owned restaurants and cafeterias where it is available to tourists 
and locals but at a price not affordable to many Cubans, thus creating tensions with 
the local population. The illegal market has been an important source of milk and beef 
for the population since the 1990’s, and at prices more accessible than those of the 
official dollarised stores that target tourists and Cubans that receive remittances 
(Togores González 2003). 
The legal restrictions on cattle production and the trade of cattle products and 
production inputs limit the possible marketing channels available to producers. The 
only legal market for milk and beef is the state through highly centralised structures, 
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even if some direct distribution of milk to approved outlets was recently allowed. Any 
other distribution of beef and milk is considered illegal. The state producers act as 
controllers for milk and beef marketing, and they also distribute the payments 
received by UBPC and private producers. Sales of live cattle for purposes other than 
slaughter are also tightly controlled by the state, but private producers need more 
permissions than state or UBPC farms in order to participate in these exchanges 
(Resolution Nr. 5 2003). 
Producers deliver their milk to the milk enterprise (Empresa Láctea) and, in a 
small proportion, to end consumers in approved outlets (Figure 2). The delivery to 
these outlets was only recently allowed as a way to decrease product losses and 
distribution costs (Carrobello 2007). The surveyed UBPC collectives sell 94% of their 
milk to the state, of which less than nine percent is delivered directly to approved 
outlets. Beef, on the other hand, must be turned over in full to the livestock enterprise 
(Empresa Pecuaria) or state farm, which in turn sells it to the slaughterhouse (Figure 
3). Private producers also participate in the illegal market and consume their milk, 
while this is less likely for state farms or UBPC. Among the UBPC interviewed, less 
than six percent of the total milk production in 2007 was reported as consumed in the 
UBPC or given to members, and this was mainly due to delays in the collection of the 
product by the state. The consumption of their own milk is not foreseen in the UBPC 
annual production plans. Beef, on the other hand, is more difficult to be consumed or 
sold on the illegal market because of the constant herd inventories, but authorities and 
experts express suspicions that private producers sometimes hide the birth of calves. 
The tight control that the UBPC and state farms face makes it virtually impossible to 
hide the birth of calves. The next section explains in detail some of the legal 
constraints associated with the illegal marketing and consumption of beef. 
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Figure 2. Marketing channels for milk produced by private, UBPC and state 
producers. 
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Figure 3. Marketing channels for beef produced by private, UBPC and state 
producers. 
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Cattle enterprises organise cattle production and marketing, and thus have the 
dual function of producers and of controllers of other producers.  Each cattle 
enterprise (usually one per municipality, but this has changed in a number of 
provinces since 2008) has a number of UBPC and private producers under its control. 
In the case of the UBPC, the state enterprise even develops the units’ production plans 
and, in some cases, keeps the administrative and financial control of the collective. 
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The legal marketing channels for milk and beef determine the private and UBPC 
producer’s access to inputs and services, as they depend on the fulfilment of contracts 
between these producers and the state, represented by the state farms, or cattle, milk 
and meat enterprises. Official prices (Table 2) are also set by the state and are 
generally considered below production costs (González et al. 2003). Payments are 
usually greatly delayed and, at least in the case of UBPC collectives, are distributed 
by the cattle enterprise even if the official buyer is another state enterprise (such as 
milk or meat enterprises). The state producers, therefore, take on multiple roles: 
besides from production, they are responsible for production control, input and service 
supply, and are also “intermediaries” between other producers and the state, especially 
in the beef trade. State officials control inputs, marketing, payments and penalties, but 
have little incentive to produce or to cover production costs, since their salary is fixed 
by the state. 
 
Table 2. Average milk and beef prices for producers and consumers for different 
marketing channels, Cuba 2007-2008.  
Period 01.-06.2007 07.-12.2007 01.-02.2008 
Prices paid by the state to producers a 
Milk (cuban pesos/liter) 0,99 2,45 2,45 
Beef (cuban pesos/kg live weight) 2,30 5,06 5,06 
Consumer prices in the illegal market, at national or province level b 
Milk (cuban pesos/liter), Cuba 5,28 4,68 5,02 
Beef (cuban pesos/kg), Cuba -- 115,00 c 55,34 
Beef (cuban pesos/kg), Las Tunas  -- -- 33,18 
Beef (cuban pesos/kg), Holguín -- -- 40,68 
Sources: a own survey with 30 UBPC in Santiago de Cuba, Holguín and Las Tunas; b own 
calculations based on data from (ONE 2008b); c (Reuters 2007). 
 
Cattle producers have important incentives for participating in the illegal 
markets, as the prices are above those offered by the state (Table 2). The participation 
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in this market is risky, though, as will be explained in the next section. The state has 
tried numerous times to stop the illegal markets by fining and punishing participants, 
and also, in July 2007, by increasing the official prices offered to producers. Before 
the price increase the average official price paid to the interviewed UBPC was less 
than a fifth of the prices in the illegal market (Table 2). Illegal prices for milk 
apparently were reduced around 10% as the official prices more than doubled in July 
2007, however this effect seems to be lost with time. No official information was 
found for beef prices in the first semester of 2007, but a newspaper article reported 
that one kilogram of beef costed around 115 pesos in November (Reuters 2007). The 
comparison of beef official and illegal prices seem to show a huge difference (Table 
2). The illegal prices vary widely among provinces, but the lowest reported price for 
beef in Las Tunas province is almost seven times higher than the official one. The real 
difference should be lower, however, as the official price is for live animals, and the 
consumer prices are for cut meat without bones (ONE 2008b). 
Punishment in the beef trade 
At present, Cuban legislation on cattle tenure falls under a set of special laws (linked 
with production and economics) and not civil law. As a result, property rights 
regarding cattle are not like those of other goods, since cattle are considered to be of 
social and not private importance (Ramón Philippón 2007; Velazco Mugarra 1999). 
The uses of cattle and cattle products are rigorously outlined in the various 
regulations. The registry of cattle is strictly defined, as are special rules for the 
breeding and registry of pure breeds. The state keeps a close control over herd 
numbers by regular national inventories (monthly and annual) that owners and 
keepers must perform and communicate to authorities. Cattle exchange, 
transportation, reproduction and consumption are rigorously regulated. Private owners 
need more permissions and must follow harsher rules in order to exchange or 
transport their livestock than UBPC and state farms. Cattle slaughter can only be 
carried out by the state, or under exceptional circumstances by police, as in the case of 
accidents or sickness. Owners are not allowed to consume their own animals, and 
must sell them to the state (Resolution Nr. 5 2003). 
Breaches to the regulations are covered by misdemeanour decrees (for 
example, the Decree 225 of 1997) and by the penal code. Both the penalties and the 
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imprisonment years have increased in the last decades (Law Nr. 62 1988; Law Nr. 87 
1999; Gomez Treto 1991). Moreover, proprietors that are victims of theft or whose 
animals suffer accidents are punished with fines, confiscations or forced sales of their 
livestock (Decree Nr. 225 1997). The penalties applied for the “illegal slaughter” of 
cattle are of 4 to 10 years of prison, and since these crimes are considered grave, the 
convictions can be added up if more than one animal was killed or other crimes were 
also committed, such as transportation or sale of the product. In this way, prison terms 
can sum up to 30 years (Law Nr. 87 1999; de la Cruz Ochoa 2000). The illegal 
transport, sale or consumption of beef is also punishable with prison terms (Law Nr. 
87 1999) so that it is no surprise that cattle and beef related criminality are two of the 
offences with a higher number of convictions in Cuba (de la Cruz Ochoa 2000; Pavó 
Acosta 2003). The harsh legislation against illegal slaughter of cattle is directed at 
both producers and at cattle rustlers. Cattle theft is a widespread problem according to 
published and anecdotic evidence (Espinosa Chepe 2001; Pavó Acosta 2003), and the 
state considers that owners are at fault for not protecting their animals or because they 
collaborate with rustlers as a way to market their produce (de la Cruz Ochoa 2000; 
Gomez Treto 1991; Pavó Acosta undated). 
Performance of Cuba’s cattle sector 
As was already briefly mentioned before, the total production and productivity of the 
cattle sector in Cuba has been decreasing over time (García Álvarez 2003; Nova 
Gonzalez 2008e). Available statistics reflect a steady decrease of all indicators of 
performance since 1995, including total herd size, milk and beef production (ONE 
2000; ONE 2006; ONE 2008a; ONE 2009a). Despite this, there are indications that 
the decrease in productivity had already started during the decade of 1980 (Funes-
Monzote 2008). 
Detailed and disaggregated data on the productive performance of the different 
producer types is not easily available. Data from the national statistics office (ONE) is 
usually separated between the major producers. The Table 3 shows the total herd size, 
as well as milk and beef production for the different producer types, as reported by 
ONE. The private producers include the CPA, CCS, dispersed and landless producers. 
Some information is only reported for state and non-state producers, defined as the 
above mentioned private and UBPC collectives.  
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The level of aggregation and unclear data collection methods make it difficult 
to establish the productive or economic performance of the producer types based on 
this information. For example, there is no explanation regarding the treatment of 
home consumption or sales outside the legally recognized marketing channels. 
Moreover, statistics on beef sales do not seem to reflect production accurately, as, for 
example, the state sector accounts for 95% of the total beef produced with only 26% 
of the total herd. The information on herd size should be considerably better, as it is 
based on constant herd inventories held with a high frequency throughout the country. 
The table shows that private producers are the only ones with increasing total herd 
numbers in the last years (ONE 2006; ONE 2008a; ONE 2009a; ONE 2009b). These 
results agree with previously published reports (García Álvarez 2003), thus showing 
that this trend has been holding for a long period. 
 
Table 3. Total cattle owned, milk and beef production by the state, UBPC and private 
producers during 2008.  
 State UBPC  Private 
Total cattle (thousand heads) 981,1 739,6 2.100,6 
Change in total cattle heads 2005-2009 (%) - 10 % - 3 % + 17 % 
Milk produced (million liters) 72,07 113,19 303,74 
Annual milk yield (kg/animal)* 1671,0 1427,0 
Beef produced (thousand tons) 117,89 5,66 0,33 
Source: based on data and own calculations (ONE 2006; ONE 2008a; ONE 2009a) 
* Milk yield only reported for state and non-state producers. FAO reports an annual milk 
yield of 1455,8 kg/animal for Cuba in 2008 (FAOSTAT 2010). 
 
The economic performance of the different producer types is even more 
difficult to estimate based on available information. The authors are not aware of any 
study of farm income of private producers, and there have been only a limited number 
of estimates of family income for these producers. However, these family income 
estimates do not include any income coming from private exchanges, and thus does 
not include the illegal market or other legal activities such as private jobs or sales in 
the open agricultural markets (Leyva Remón 2006). Nevertheless, it is widely 
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accepted that most private producers have a much higher family income than public or 
UBPC workers (Togores González 2003), with the only exception being new recent 
individual usufructuaries that apparently have not been able to insert themselves 
successfully in the market (Leyva Remón 2006). 
Very few studies have been published related to the economic performance of 
the cattle UBPC collectives. It appears that since their creation in 1993, only a low 
percentage of the farms has been defined as profitable by the Ministry of Agriculture. 
During the first 6 years of their creation, the percentage of profitable cattle UBPC 
ranged from 18 to 42% before reaching a maximum in the year of 2000 of 70% 
profitable farms. Profitability fell again until 2005, the last reported year, when only 
21% of the farms managed to break even (López Labrada 2007). More detailed 
publications on the economic performance of UBPC farms, point out to a low 
productivity, restricted availability of feed and improved pastures, as well as low milk 
prices as the main reasons of low profitability (Díaz Viladevall et al. 2003; González 
et al. 2003). The case of the surveyed UBPC collectives shows a better overall 
economic performance. During 2007, only 14% of the studied farms suffered losses. 
According to experts in the area, this year was extraordinary both in terms of 
production and as a result of the increase of beef and milk prices in July 2007. The 
results show also a huge variation in the net annual income of the collective farms. 
The institutional framework and production problems 
The institutional arrangements described in the previous sections drive the behaviour 
of the economic actors involved in the cattle sector. We find that the property rights in 
the agricultural sector of Cuba are incomplete, both for land and for cattle. For 
example, land sales are forbidden and there is no land market (Pavó Acosta 2008). For 
cattle, we can also describe the property rights regime as incomplete and insecure. It 
is incomplete because private owners of cattle cannot decide on the uses of their 
animals; commercial exchanges are only possible with the state and owners are not 
even allowed to consume their own products. Insecurity in the property rights of cattle 
is given by the threat of confiscation from the police or forced sale to state agencies, 
besides from cattle theft. Insecurity is more pronounced for private producers as 
compared to UBPC producers or state farms. 
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The incomplete and insecure property rights impact agricultural production 
and economic performance in the sector through a range of mechanisms. Moreover, it 
is suspected that these mechanisms affect the main producer types described in this 
paper in different degrees. For example, one of the main negative impacts of 
insufficient property rights is the sub-optimal use of the resource (Alston and Mueller 
2005; Feder and Feeny 1991; Schlager and Ostrom 1992). This mechanism would 
explain the poor performance and low resource use of the interviewed UBPC farms 
and state farms. Many of these farms not only have a high percentage of unused land, 
but also show a lack of investments in improved pastures or in fencing and protecting 
their areas. Some publications suggest that private producers, on the other hand, may 
be overusing their resources as well as common resources by having high and 
unsustainable stocking rates and overgrazing (Iraola et al. 2007; Wezel and Bender 
2004). The incentives of overusing resources that private producers have could be a 
result of their easier access to illegal milk markets and revenues as compared to state 
and UBPC producers. The private producers, due to their number and dispersion, are 
harder to monitor and therefore can either consume or sell part of their milk. The 
UBPC cooperatives and state farms, on the other hand, are easier to monitor and 
apparently have fewer incentives to use their resources more efficiently. The resulting 
over- and under explotation of land results in the degradation of soils and endangers 
future production. 
The insecurity of property rights can also affect negatively the producers by 
causing them to incur in self-enforcement costs for the defence of their cattle and the 
reduction of losses such as theft and even accidents (Alston and Mueller 2005; 
Mercuro and Medema 1997). The excessive costs of controlling the cattle herd size, 
for example by monthly and annual census, are only partly covered by the state. Other 
costs that the producers must cover are related to labour for protection, modification 
of stables, among others. The costs for private producers are probably higher than the 
costs for other types of producers, since they are doubly punished, by the state and by 
the cattle rustlers. 
In addition to the impact of legislation on each producer type, the cattle sector 
as a whole suffers from lack of efficiency as a result of a lack of entry and exit rights. 
The lack or insufficiency of land and cattle markets associated with the incomplete 
property rights affect productivity by avoiding that the most efficient or interested 
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producers have access to land or cattle (Alston and Mueller 2005). The entry rights to 
this activity are only issued by the state and are limited to small plots of land in 
usufruct (Enríquez 2003). Landless owners of cattle, on the other hand, are not given 
rights to land, forcing them to use common or state resources to feed their livestock. 
The UBPC collectives have the additional problem that they are not even allowed to 
abandon cattle production as legislation forces them to continue producing. The 
Decree-Law that created the UBPC and subsequent regulations issued by the Ministry 
of Agriculture state that these collectives have a “social objective” defined by their 
main line of production, and that this “social objective” can only be changed by the 
state (Decree-Law Nr. 142 1993;  Resolution Nr. 688 1997). This means that UBPC 
cattle owners cannot decide to stop their ownership of cattle, while private producers 
can. The strict limits to the entry and exit of producers have the potential to decrease 
the overall productivity of the sector (Migot-Adholla et al. 1991). 
The last aspect regarding the institutional framework of the cattle sector that 
will be discussed deals with the penal and administrative punishment of cattle owners, 
illegal traders and consumers. On one hand, the harsh punishments to those accused of 
unlawfully slaughtering cattle has resulted in an important public problem. Crimes 
related to cattle and beef are of the most common in the criminal rates, and have led to 
an increase of the imprisoned population in the country (de la Cruz Ochoa 2000; Pavó 
Acosta 2003). Moreover, the strategy of punishing producers may have the opposite 
effect than that intended, namely, of increasing beef production. Two mechanisms 
could be responsible for this, besides from the increase in defence costs incurred by 
producers. The first one is that the punishment of victims could be leading to a 
deterrence of the perceived crime, namely, cattle ownership. The second mechanism 
has to do with organised crime. The increase in severity in the punishment of the 
crimes can lead to an increase of either the effectiveness of the crime networks 
(Garoupa 2007), or of their output, including the decrease of prices (Mansour et al. 
2006). The economic attractiveness of stealing cattle or slaughtering their own cattle 
to be sold as beef in the illegal markets is apparently huge (Table 2), and perceived by 
many in Cuba as a way to become rich. At the same time, the illegal market offers 
lower prices to the consumers of both milk and beef as compared to state shops 
(Togores González 2003), making this commerce both attractive and socially accepted 
by consumers. 
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Conclusions 
The cattle sector of Cuba has a complex structure and is governed by a number of 
institutions that lead to low productivity. Three main producer types can be 
recognised based on their property rights over land and cattle, and their organisational 
dependence from the state. The producer types are identified as state farms, where 
workers have no claim over land, cattle, or decision making; state dependent 
collective farms (UBPC) with land in usufruct and a limited claim over production 
surplus and income; and private smallholders with more property rights over land and 
cattle, and a higher independence from the state. The state and UBPC producers are 
characterised by extensive production systems and under use of resources, especially 
land. Private producers, on the other hand, have smaller and more diversified farms, 
but apparently tend to overuse their resources as well as communal pastures. Private 
producers have a better access to illegal milk (and maybe beef) markets with much 
higher prices than the legal markets forced upon state and UBPC producers. However, 
the costs for participating in the illegal markets, especially for beef, are very high, and 
are suffered more intensively by private producers. Private producers whose cattle 
suffer accidents or are stolen, face the threat of fines, confiscation and forced sale of 
their animals. 
The private, state and UBPC producer types are affected in different ways by 
these institutional arrangements. The property rights over land and cattle are 
incomplete and insecure. UBPC producers have limited rights to residual income from 
cattle production, while state producers have practically none. Private producers have 
higher benefits from their cattle production activities through home consumption and 
access to illegal milk markets. However, private producers’ ownership of cattle is 
more insecure as compared with state or UBPC producers. The cattle sector is also 
characterised by a lack of mechanisms to enter and (in the case of state and UBPC 
farms) to exit the cattle production sector. This causes an overall decrease of 
efficiency by forbidding efficient producers to enter the sector or to increase their 
farms, and on the other hand, by not allowing the worst producers to exit production. 
Despite a lack of independent data on performance of the three producer types, 
it is clear that the private producers seems to be more successful than the UBPC 
collectives and the state farms, as they are the only ones showing a constant increase 
of the herd size in the last years. The fact that at least one producer type is able to 
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increase its herd puts in doubt the prevailing idea that production problems of the 
sector are a result of technical and resource problems. The mechanisms and results 
presented in this study are only a first exploration of the topic. The lack of published 
results dealing with Cuban institutions, informal markets and prices, coupled with the 
complexity of the sector, call for more detailed research in the future.  
 
References 
Alston, L.J. and Mueller, B., 2005. Property Rights and the State. In C. Menard and 
M.M. Shirley, eds. Handbook of New Institutional Economics. Dordrecht, The 
Netherlands: Springer Verlag, 573-590.  
Álvarez Licea, M.D., 2001. Estructuras De Producción y Sostenibilidad En La 
Agricultura Campesina Cubana. In F. Funes, L. García, M. Bourque, N. Pérez 
and P. Rosset, eds. Transformando el Campo Cubano. Avances de la 
Agricultura Sostenible. La Habana: ACTAF, FoodFirst, CEAS, 71-92.  
Alvarez, J., 2004. Cuba's Agricultural Sector. Gainesville: University Press of 
Florida.  
Benítez, D., Ramírez, A., Guevara, O., Pérez, B., Torres, V., Díaz, M., Pérez, D., 
Guerra, J., Miranda, M. and Ricardo, O., 2008. Determinant Factors on the 
Productive Efficiency of Cattle Farms of the Mountain Area of Granma 
Province, Cuba. Cuban Journal of Agricultural Science, 42 (3), 247-253.  
Benítez, D., Ray, J., Torres, V., Ramírez, A., Viamontes, M.I., Tandrón, I., Díaz, M., 
Guerra, J. and Pérez, D., 2002. Factors Affecting the Productive Efficiency of 
the Dual-Purpose Herd Systems from Cattle Production Farms in the Valley of 
Cauto (Granma), Cuba. Cuban Journal of Agricultural Science, 36 (3), 209-215.  
Borroto, A., Arencibia, Á.C., López, J.L., Leyva, L.J., Mazorra, C.A., Dopico, G.E., 
Maurelo, R. and Caraballoso, A., 2006. Sociocultural Aspects in the Productive 
Efficiency of Small Livestock in the Primero De Enero Municipality, Ciego De 
Ávila, Cuba. Pastos y Forrajes, 29 (2), 203-212.  
Carrobello C., 2007. Del Ordeño Al Biberón [online]. Bohemia: Revista Ilustrada de 
Análisis General, 5 (17). Available from: 
Chapter 2. Legal regulations and agricultural production      29 
http://www.bohemia.cubaweb.cu/2007/08/13/nacionales/2-leche.html [Accessed 
21 August 2007].  
Cruz, A.I., Suset, A., Suárez, J. and Esperance, M., 1999. Socioeconomic Aspects of 
Introducing Silvopastoral Systems in the Province of Havana. / Aspectos 
Socioeconomicos Del Proceso De Introduccion De Los Sistemas Silvopastoriles 
En La Provincia La Habana. Pastos y Forrajes, 22 (4), 371-379.  
de la Cruz Ochoa R., 2000. El Delito, La Criminología y El Derecho Penal En Cuba 
Después De 1959 [online]. Revista Electrónica de Ciencia Penal y 
Criminología, 02 (02). Available from: http://criminet.ugr.es/recpc/ [Accessed 
02 April 2009].  
Decree-Law Nr. 125, Régimen de posesión, propiedad y herencia de la tierra y bienes 
agropecuarios, Consejo de Estado de la República de Cuba, La Habana, Cuba, 
(1991).  
Decree-Law Nr. 142, Sobre las Unidades Básicas de Producción Cooperativa, 
Consejo de Estado de la República de Cuba, La Habana, Cuba, (1993).  
Decree-Law Nr. 217, De la seguridad social de los miembros de las cooperativas de 
producción agropecuaria, Consejo de Estado de la República de Cuba, La 
Habana, Cuba, (2001).  
Decree Nr. 225, Decreto de Contravenciones Personales de las Regulaciones para el 
Control y Registro del Ganado Mayor y de las Razas Puras, Comité Ejecutivo 
del Consejo de Ministros, La Habana, Cuba, (1997).  
Decree-Law Nr. 259, Sobre la entrega de tierras ociosas en usufructo, Consejo de 
Estado de la República de Cuba, La Habana, Cuba, (2008).  
Díaz Viladevall, M., Benítez Jiménez, D., Pérez Salas, D. and Guerra Sánchez, J., 
2003. Análisis Económico-Financiero De Una Unidad Básica De Producción 
Cooperativa. Revista de Producción Animal, 15 (1), 59-62.  
Enríquez, L.J., 2003. Economic Reform and Repeasantization in Post-1990 Cuba. 
Latin American Research Review, 38 (1), 202-218.  
Espinosa Chepe, O., 2001. Aumenta El Hurto y Sacrificio Ilegal De Ganado Mayor 
En Cuba. Cubanet, September 25, 2001.  
30                                          Chapter 2. Legal regulations and agricultural production 
FAOSTAT, 2010. Livestock primary data for Cuba (2008). Available from: 
http://faostat.fao.org/site/569/default.aspx#ancor [Accessed 25 December 2010]. 
Feder, G. and Feeny, D., 1991. Land Tenure and Property Rights: Theory and 
Implications for Development Policy. The World Bank Economic Review, 5 (1), 
135-153.  
Funes-Monzote, F.R., Monzote, M., Lantinga, E.A. and Van Keulen, H., 2009. 
Conversion of Specialised Dairy Farming Systems into Sustainable Mixed 
Farming Systems in Cuba. Environment, Development and Sustainability, 11 
(4), 765-783.  
Funes-Monzote, F., 2008. Farming like we're here to stay: The Mixed Farming 
Alternative for Cuba. Thesis [PhD]. Wageningen University.  
García Álvarez A., 2003. Sustitución De Importaciones De Alimentos En Cuba: 
Necesidad Vs. Posibilidad [online]. Cuba Siglo XXI, (XXXIII). Available from: 
http://www.nodo50.org/cubasigloXXI/economia/galvarez3_310803.pdf 
[Accessed 27 April 2007].  
Garoupa, N., 2007. Optimal Law Enforcement and Criminal Organization. Journal of 
Economic Behavior & Organization, 63 (3), 461-474.  
Gomez Treto, R., 1991. Thirty Years of Cuban Revolutionary Penal Law. Latin 
American Perspectives, 18 (2), 114-125.  
González, L., Machado, H. and Suset, A., 2003. Diagnosis of the Main Limitations in 
Livestock BUCPs: A Territorial Case Study. / Diagnóstico De Las Principales 
Limitaciones En Las UBPC Ganaderas: Un Estudio De Caso Territorial. Pastos 
y Forrajes, 26 (2), 163-171.  
Granma 2008. Miembros Del Consejo De Estado. Granma, 24 February 2008.  
Iraola, J., Muñoz, E. and Torres, V., 2007. Alternatives to Improve the Diversified 
Feed Production According to the Environment in Small Farms. Cuban Journal 
of Agricultural Science, 41 (1), 19-24.  
Jordán Morales, A. and Lugo Fonte, O., 1994. Indicaciones Del Ministro De La 
Agricultura y Del Presidente De La ANAP [Unpublished document]. La 
Habana, Cuba: Ministry of Agriculture.  
Chapter 2. Legal regulations and agricultural production      31 
Kay, C., 1988. El Desarrollo Agrario En Cuba: Reformas Económicas y 
Colectivización. Desarrollo Económico, 27 (108), 559-587.  
Law Nr. 62, Código Penal, Asamblea Nacional del Poder Popular de la República de 
Cuba, La Habana, Cuba, (1988).  
Law Nr. 87, Modificativa del Código Penal, Asamblea Nacional del Poder Popular de 
la República de Cuba, La Habana, Cuba, (1999).  
Law Nr. 95, Ley de cooperativas de producción agropecuaria y de créditos y 
servicios, Asamblea Nacional del Poder Popular de la República de Cuba, La 
Habana, Cuba, (2002). 
Leyva Remón, A., 2006. Cambios Socioclasistas y Relaciones Agrarias En La 
Provincia Granma a Partir De 1993. Thesis [Doctor in Sociology]. Universidad 
de La Habana, Facultad de Filosofía e Historia, Departamento de Sociología.  
López Labrada, A., 2007. Hacia Una Gestión Estratégica En Las UBPC. Tras El Hilo 
Del Ovillo. La Habana, Cuba: Editorial José Martí.  
Mansour, A., Marceau, N. and Mongrain, S., 2006. Gangs and Crime Deterrence. J 
Law Econ Organ, 22 (2), 315-339.  
Markussen, T., 2008. Property Rights, Productivity, and Common Property 
Resources: Insights from Rural Cambodia. World Development, 36 (11), 2277-
2296.  
Mercuro, N. and Medema, S.G., 1997. Economics and the Law. from Posner to Post-
Modernism. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press.  
Migot-Adholla, S., Hazell, P., Blarel, B. and Place, F., 1991. Indigenous Land Rights 
Systems in Sub-Saharan Africa: A Constraint on Productivity? The World Bank 
Economic Review, 5 (1), 155-175.  
Nova Gonzalez A., 2008a. El Actual Mercado Interno De Los Alimentos [online]. 
Cuba Siglo XXI, LXXXVIII (June 2008). Available from: 
http://www.nodo50.org/cubasigloXXI/economia/novag_310508.pdf [Accessed 
10 June 2008].  
Nova Gonzalez A., 2008b. La Agricultura En Cuba Actualidad y Transformaciones 
Necesarias [online]. Cuba Siglo XXI, XC (August 2008). Available from: 
32                                          Chapter 2. Legal regulations and agricultural production 
http://www.nodo50.org/cubasigloXXI/economia/novag_310808.pdf [Accessed 
24 September 2008].  
Nova Gonzalez A., 2008c. El Modelo Agrícola Cubano En La Etapa 1993-2008 
[online]. Cuba Siglo XXI, XC (August 2008). Available from: 
http://www.nodo50.org/cubasigloXXI/economia/novag4_310808.pdf [Accessed 
24 September 2008].  
Nova Gonzalez A., 2008d. El Modelo De Desarrollo Agrícola Cubano En El Período 
1959-1990 [online]. Cuba Siglo XXI, XC (August 2008). Available from: 
http://www.nodo50.org/cubasigloXXI/economia/novag3_310808.pdf [Accessed 
24 September 2008].  
Nova Gonzalez A., 2008e. La Producción De Leche y La Sustitución De Alimentos 
Importados [online]. Boletín cuatrimestral: Avances de Investigación CEEC, 
April 2008 Available from: 
http://www.ceec.uh.cu/Sitio800/paginas/Publicaciones/Boletin/Boletin%20Abril
%202008.rar [Accessed 17 July 2009].  
Nova Gonzalez, A. and García Álvarez, A., 2002. El Sector Agropecuario Cubano: 
Importancia y Transformación, La Habana: Universidad de La Habana, Centro 
de Estudios de la Economía Cubana.  
ONE, 2000. Anuario Estadístico De Cuba 2000. La Habana: Oficina Nacional de 
Estadísticas.  
ONE, 2006. Anuario Estadístico De Cuba 2005. La Habana: Oficina Nacional de 
Estadísticas.  
ONE, 2008a. Anuario Estadístico De Cuba 2007. La Habana: Oficina Nacional de 
Estadísticas.  
ONE, 2008b. Sondeo De Precios En El Mercado Informal. Febrero 2008. La Habana, 
Cuba: Oficina Nacional de Estadísticas.  
ONE, 2008c. Ventas En El Mercado Agropecuario. Enero-Diciembre 2007. La 
Habana, Cuba: Oficina Nacional de Estadísticas.  
ONE, 2009a. Anuario Estadístico De Cuba 2008. La Habana: Oficina Nacional de 
Estadísticas.  
Chapter 2. Legal regulations and agricultural production      33 
ONE, 2009b. Sector Agropecuario. Principales Indicadores. Enero - Agosto 2009, La 
Habana, Cuba: Oficina Nacional de Estadísticas.  
ONE, 2009c. Ventas En El Mercado Agropecuario. Enero-Diciembre 2008. La 
Habana, Cuba: Oficina Nacional de Estadísticas.  
Pavó Acosta, R., 2003. El Sacrificio Ilegal Del Ganado Mayor: Su Tratamiento 
Jurídico. Revista Santiago, 100 (May-August), 166-169.  
Pavó Acosta R., 2008. Marco Jurídico De La Propiedad Individual Sobre La Tierra En 
El Derecho Agrario Cubano [online]. Revista Científica Equipo Federal del 
trabajo, 33 Available from: http://www.newsmatic.e-
pol.com.ar/index.php?pub_id=99&sid=1174&aid=27925&eid=33&NombreSec
cion=Notas%20de%20c%E1tedra%20universitaria&Accion=VerArticulo 
[Accessed 02 April 2009].  
Pavó Acosta, R., undated. El Régimen Jurídico De La Ganadería En Cuba 
[Unpublished document]. Santiago de Cuba: Universidad de Oriente.  
Ramón Philippón, R., 2007. Aportes Históricos y Perspectivas Del Derecho Agrario 
En Cuba. In Anonymous V Congreso Americano de Derecho Agrario, August 1, 
2 and 3, 2007. Guatemala: Comitè Americano de Derecho Agrario, 12.  
Resolution Nr. 688, Reglamento General de las Unidades Básicas de Producción 
Cooperativa del Ministerio de la Agricultura, Ministry of Agriculture, La 
Habana, Cuba, (1997).  
Resolution Nr. 5, Reglamento para el Control del Ganado Mayor, Ministry of 
Agriculture, La Habana, Cuba, (2003).  
Reuters 2007. Cubanos Vuelven a Recibir Carne Bovina Por Primera Vez En Años. 
Reuters, 15 November 2007.  
Schlager, E. and Ostrom, E., 1992. Property-Rights Regimes and Natural Resources: 
A Conceptual Analysis. Land Economics, 68 (3), 249.  
Suárez, J., Albisu, L.M., Sotolongo, N. and Blanco, F., 2007. Success and Failure 
Factors in the Innovating Performance of the Cuban Livestock Production 
Enterprises. Pastos y Forrajes, 30 (3), 381-394.  
34                                          Chapter 2. Legal regulations and agricultural production 
Togores González V., 2003. Algunas Consideraciones Acerca Del Acceso Al 
Consumo En Los Noventa, Factores Que Lo Determinan [online]. Cuba Siglo 
XXI, XXXIV (October 2003). Available from: 
http://www.nodo50.org/cubasigloXXI/economia/togores2_300903.pdf 
[Accessed June 10 2009].  
Velazco Mugarra, M., 1999. El Derecho Agrario Cubano «Propuesta Al Legislador». 
Revista Cubana de Derecho, 13 (June 1999), 42-65.  
Wezel, A. and Bender, S., 2002. Agricultural Land use in the Coastal Area of the 
Alexander Von Humboldt National Park, Cuba and its Implication for 
Conservation and Sustainability. GeoJournal, 57 (4), 241-249.  
Wezel, A. and Bender, S., 2004. Degradation of Agro-Pastoral Village Land in Semi-
Arid Southeastern Cuba. Journal of Arid Environments, 59 (2), 299-311.  
  
  
 
 
 
CHAPTER 3.  
Poverty and food consumption among workers in collective 
farms of Eastern Cuba 
Mercedes Jaffé and Manfred Zeller 
 
Abstract: This study explores poverty and food access of collective farm households 
in Eastern Cuba by using principal component analysis and other methods. Our 
analysis shows that relative poverty is characterized by differences in the frequency of 
consumption of food items not supplied by the state’s rationing system, and 
households with access to land have higher diet diversity. Additionally, severe 
incentive problems are revealed, as workers are not rewarded for the performance of 
their farms, effectively uncoupling poverty and collective agricultural production. The 
paper derives conclusions for food and agricultural policy and calls for more socio-
economic research in Cuba. 
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1. Introduction 
Cuba’s economic and political system brings it apart from other developing countries. 
Social policies hold a significant place in planning and public expenditures and the 
government made social equality of the population one of its priorities. As a result, 
Cuba achieved an important improvement in the availability and quality of education, 
health, and social assistance services (Mesa Lago, 2005; Álvarez & Máttar, 2004). 
However, the severe crisis suffered by the country in the early 1990s caused a 
deterioration of social indicators. Public expenditures decreased, and the quality and 
access to social services suffered (Mesa Lago, 2005; Togores González, 2004; 
Álvarez & Máttar, 2004). Food production and imports declined, and as access to 
food fell, the population suffered nutrient deficiencies and widespread weight loss 
(Alvarez, 2004; Funes-Monzote, 2008). Monetary and other reforms caused an 
increasing inequality linked to remittances and access to employment in tourism and 
foreign firms (Eckstein, 2010; Espina Prieto, 2008a; Noguera, 2004). 
In the agricultural sector, the reforms were wide reaching and tried to counteract the 
sudden loss of imported production inputs and the decreased availability of food for 
the population. The most important steps taken were to break up a number of the large 
and inefficient state farms and transform them into worker-owned collective farms 
called UBPC (Basic Units of Cooperative Production), to open agricultural markets, 
and to allow individuals and communities produce food for home consumption in 
unused state land (Alvarez, 2004; Deere, 1997; Enríquez, 2000; Nova Gonzalez, 
2002). These reforms created two new agricultural producer groups, namely the 
UBPC and the individual land usufructuaries. These new groups, together with private 
individual and collective farmers, and state farm workers, make up a complex mixture 
of organization and land tenure types. Farmers in the private sector have been able to 
insert themselves successfully in production and marketing chains, improving their 
economic wellbeing (Espina Prieto, 2008b; Noguera, 2004). On the other side, the 
members of the new UBPC farms have been left behind (Leyva Remón, 2006).  
There appears to be a consensus that the crisis and reforms of the early 1990s caused 
an increase of poverty and vulnerability in Cuba (Álvarez & Máttar, 2004). Despite 
this, there have been few attempts to measure poverty, with only one study based on a 
representative household survey (Añé Aguiloche, 2005). This study was made in the 
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city of Havana and it is not representative of conditions in other cities or rural areas. 
The rural sector has been mostly neglected in the poverty studies published in Cuba, 
and so far, Cuban researchers have made few attempts to measure or explore the 
phenomenon (Espina Prieto, 2008a). Food security and the differential access to food 
have been a concern for researchers since the opening of agricultural markets, but so 
far few studies at household level have been published (Añé Aguiloche, 2005; 
Togores González & García Álvarez, 2004; Togores González, 2004).  
The present study deals with the members of the UBPC collective farms. In 2008 the 
UBPCs accounted for 37% of total agricultural land, making them the most important 
producer group in terms of area. These collectives were meant to solve the production 
problems of the large state farms by reducing their size, increasing their autonomy, 
and improving the incentives to the workers. Moreover, they were expected to 
partially substitute some the social services offered by the state, especially food 
provision. UBPC farms have been plagued with low agricultural production and 
profitability since their creation in 1993, which have been blamed on technical and 
resource factors, as well as their lack of autonomy from the state (Alvarez, 2004; 
López Labrada, 2007; Nova Gonzalez, 2008b; ONE, 2009). Poor performance in 
collective farms is not exclusive of Cuba. In other countries, efficiency and 
underlying incentive problems have led to the dismantling of collective farms in 
preference for corporate or family farms (Deininger, 1995; Lerman et al, 2002). 
The objectives of this study are to explore poverty and food access at household level 
and their relation to agricultural production at both collective and household levels. 
The exploration of the variables related to poverty is based on a multivariate index of 
relative poverty at household level, in order to address the need to consider several 
dimensions of poverty additional to income or expenditures per capita (Henry et al, 
2003;  Zeller et al, 2006). We will first present the data and methodology used. After 
this, the variables related with poverty will be explored both in the sphere of the 
household, its activities and resources, and in the sphere of collective agricultural 
production. The implications on agricultural and food security policies and on poverty 
studies in Cuba will then be discussed. Last of all, conclusions and outlook for future 
research will be presented. 
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2. Data and methods 
The data used in this study were collected in the frame of a baseline study for a rural 
development project aimed at increasing agricultural production and improving the 
living standard of producers. In total, 170 households belonging to 30 cattle collective 
farms (UBPC) of Santiago de Cuba, Holguín and Las Tunas provinces were 
interviewed in the first three months of 2008, and this information was completed 
with in depth interviews with the administrators of their 30 farms and two additional 
UBPC farms, as well as local experts, authorities and key informants. The Eastern 
Region where the three provinces are located is considered one of the poorest in Cuba 
due to reduced food security, health and other indicators (Enríquez, 2003; Espina 
Prieto, 2008a; Mendoza Castellanos & et al, 2001; Noguera, 2004). The information 
collected includes household demography, education and occupation of household 
members, food consumption patterns, state and materials of the dwelling, producer 
and consumer assets (except private land), access to public services such as 
electricity, and household expenditures as an indicator of income poverty. 
Additionally, the questionnaire included a self-reported “quality of life” measure, and 
the enumeration of aspects affecting this “quality of life” positively and negatively. At 
collective farm level, data was gathered regarding production activities, use of land 
and labor resources, indicators of farm productivity in crop production and animal 
husbandry activities, overall financial performance of the UBPC as well as its 
organization. 
Raw food consumption data was used to construct three sets of indices. The Dietary 
Diversity index was constructed by adding the number of different food categories 
consumed by the household during a recall period of three days. This index included 
10 food categories based on their food group (Hatloy et al, 2000;  Ruel,  2003) and on 
the different food sources and marketing channels in Cuba (Añé Aguiloche, 2005; 
Togores González & García Álvarez, 2004). Additionally, a Market Food index and a 
Ration Food index were built to separate the consumption of food items primarily 
obtained in legal and illegal agricultural markets (roots and tubers, fresh vegetables, 
fruits and fish) from the ones mainly obtained as part of the rationing system (rice, 
pulses and bread). Both indices were constructed by adding the frequency of 
consumption of each food type during the recall period. 
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Principal component analysis (PCA) was used with the household level data to 
identify variables closely related to expenditures and to construct an index of relative 
poverty following the methodology developed by Henry et al (2003). Other 
applications of principal component analysis regarding the construction of an index of 
relative wealth include, for example, Filmer & Pritchett (2001), Sahn & Stifel (2003), 
and Zeller et al (2006). After a number of tests and on the basis of several indicators 
specific for the PCA method which are in detail described by Henry et al (2003), the 
first component resulting from the PCA can be viewed as a multivariate measure of 
poverty which captures most of the variance of the variables used to construct it. This 
poverty index was used to rank the households and assign them to three relative 
poverty groups that are then compared: Poorest, Medium and Better-off. The poverty 
index was used in subsequent analysis to test the hypothesis that household level 
conditions are associated with agricultural and economic performance, production 
activities and resources of the collective farm that employs the respective household. 
Before presenting any results, we wish to briefly describe the research process and the 
sampling procedure. Our plan – as we have done in other countries – was to design a 
questionnaire after in-depth interviews at collective and household level, a pretest of 
the questionnaire with a random sample, and a random selection of observation units 
based on a full sampling frame. However, some of the steps of this research were 
compromised by the influence of local authorities. While the research was officially 
supported by the state, certain questions in the draft questionnaire were not permitted, 
including land ownership by the household, some characteristics of the dwelling, 
detailed food consumption including periods with insufficient food and consumption 
of inferior foods, as well as separated expenditures in rationed and non-rationed food. 
Second, the selection of UBPC farms and households in each UBPC farm was 
compromised by limits imposed by authorities regarding the permitted farms and 
areas to visit and the time available for each farm, as well as suspicions of workers 
(especially in the presence of state officials). This resulted in an oversampling of the 
directive board of the farms, and possibly other biases as well. To partially correct 
this, the data set was weighted to account for salary differences between directives 
and non-directives of the UBPC. The above mentioned problems jeopardized the 
representativeness of the collected data. Despite this, the present analysis is 
considered to be valuable due to the insufficiency of published studies focusing on 
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Cuban rural households. The results can be an indication of present conditions in this 
sector and even if the results must be taken with extreme care, they offer some 
insights and suggestions for future researchers and policy interventions. 
3. The UBPC farms and their members 
The Basic Units of Cooperative Production (UBPC) are collective farms that have 
usufruct rights over state land. They were created to improve incentives by 
transforming state farm workers into “owners” of their new collectives (Alvarez, 
2004; López Labrada, 2007; Nova Gonzalez, 2002). This “ownership” means that 
members are entitled to receive a share of the annual profit of their farms, but they 
have little saying regarding production. The state decides the production activities of 
the collective farms, based on a “social objective” (objeto social). In the case under 
study, all sampled UBPC farms have milk or beef production as their “social 
objective” and main production activities. The state keeps a tight control over the 
main activities, and all the milk and beef produced must be sold to state firms at fixed 
prices. Apart from cattle, the farms have “self-consumption” (autoconsumo) activities 
that include all collective activities aimed at crops and small livestock. The most 
frequent crops produced are roots and tubers, vegetables, grains and fruits. Goats, 
sheep and pigs are the most common small livestock species kept, but a minority also 
has rabbits and poultry. The control of the state over these activities is less strict than 
for the main cattle activities. 
The collective farms studied are very heterogeneous in size and resources, ranging 
from 350 Ha to almost 3500 Ha, and from 42 workers to more than 200, not counting 
occasional work brigades mobilized from other provinces, schools or re-education 
programs. The biggest collectives are made up of productive units often far apart from 
each other. Productive and economic performance of the collectives varies even more 
widely than their size. Some of the studied UBPC farms lost up to 5600 US$ in 2007 
(138 thousand Cuban pesos) while others had profits of more than 23000 US$ (577 
thousand Cuban pesos) in the same year. These differences are the result of a huge 
variation in total production and production efficiency in their main activities: milk 
and beef. Secondary production activities also differ between the UBPC. For example, 
crop production in 2007 varied from only 2 tons to almost 400 tons. 
The UBPC collectives are made up of members and hired workers, who typically are 
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around 15% of the total work force. Few differences were found between them in the 
studied farms; therefore, the words “members” and “workers” will be used 
interchangeably. The households of these workers are rather homogeneous, in marked 
contrast to the variation found in their UBPC farms. The households have on average 
around three persons each, and a half do not have children or the children live in 
boarding schools for most of the year. The education level of the household members 
is very uniform, with only 18.5 % of the sampled adults having completed less than 
nine school years. Almost a half the sampled adults have completed at least 12 years 
of education. The UBPC farm is the most important occupation in the studied 
households, as 55% of them depend solely on it for their income. A further 45% of the 
households have an additional income source, usually in the form of public 
employment (38%). Salaried jobs are typically in state farms and agricultural firms, 
schools and other public offices. Around 40 % of household members are unemployed 
or children. 
3.1. Poverty of UBPC farm members 
The information at household level was used to construct a relative poverty index 
using principal component analysis (Henry et al, 2003). The variables selected during 
the PC analysis are presented in the Table 1. The Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure of 
sampling adequacy can be considered to be relatively high, and all the variables 
selected have adequately high component loadings. This first component captures 
35.4% of the total variance of the data. Using the variables and component loadings, 
the poverty index was calculated for each household before ranking and separating 
them in terciles for comparison. The terciles are identified as Poorest, Medium and 
Better-off households. 
Most of the variables selected for the construction of the poverty index are linked to 
food access and consumption, including the relative importance of food bought and 
home produced (Table 1). Other variables are related to the household’s access to 
products not included in government programs or the food rationing card. The dummy 
variable related to the location of the household seems to confirm that the province 
Santiago de Cuba has worse living conditions than the other two provinces (Las Tunas 
and Holguín), as has been also suggested by other authors (Espina Prieto,  2008b;  
Mendoza Castellanos & et al, 2001;  Noguera,  2004). Other variables were initially 
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included in the analysis, such as education, household demography, quality and 
reparation state of the dwelling, and access to energy and other services. However 
they showed a low explanatory power for the construction of the poverty index, with 
component loadings of less than 0.400, and were therefore excluded from the final 
PCA model (Field, 2009; Zeller et al, 2006). The lack of importance of these variables 
contrasts from what is commonly found in other studies on market economies in 
Africa, Asia and Latin America (Zeller et al, 2006). The reasons of these differences 
appear to be related to Cuba’s “equalizing” education, labor, health, and other social 
policies. For example, educational and demographic factors may not play a role due to 
the homogeneity of the households and of the employment opportunities in the rural 
areas. Access to services and housing also seems to be very equal in our sample. 
 
Table 1: Summary of the PCA results for the construction of a relative poverty index 
of households of UBPC collectives in the provinces Santiago de Cuba, Holguín and 
Las Tunas, Cuba 2008 
 Component Loadings 
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy: 0.728 
Per capita expenditures (pesos/person) 0.713 
Food value produced and consumed by the household (pesos) 0.728 
Does the household produce food for home consumption? 0.584 
Percentage of expenditures on buying food (%) -0.573 
Diet diversity index a 0.612 
Market food index b 0.610 
Does the household live in Santiago de Cuba province? -0.486 
Expenditures on parties, gifts, etc. (pesos) 0.544 
Number of radios and fans owned by the household 0.444 
Source: Own data collected among rural households being UBPC collective members in the provinces 
of Santiago de Cuba, Holguín and Las Tunas, Cuba 2008 
a Diet Diversity index: Number of different food types consumed by the households in three days 
b Market Food index: Frequency of consumption of food items mainly bought in legal or illegal markets 
(fresh vegetables, fruits, roots and tubers, fish) 
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Table 2 shows some of the characteristics of the households of the three relative 
poverty groups. There are marked differences in total expenditures between the 
groups, but how poor (in absolute terms) are the studied households? Based on their 
per capita expenditures it is difficult to answer this question, since there are no recent 
or official poverty lines published for Cuba, and there is no reliable estimate of 
purchasing parity prices to draw international comparisons (Mesa Lago, 2008). 
However, using an estimated cost of the basic food basket for Cuba (Espina Prieto, 
2008a), 23% of the sample households is extremely poor and unable to fulfill the most 
basic food needs. 
 
Table 2: Food production and annual household expenditures of UBPC collective 
members in the provinces of Santiago de Cuba, Holguín and Las Tunas, Cuba 2008 
 Poorest  
N: 57 
Medium 
N: 56 
Better-off 
N: 57 
Household produces own food (%)** 40 % 88 % 100 % 
Per capita food value produced and 
consumed a (US$/person)** 
12.7 ± 20.61 48.5 ± 43.75 112.1 ± 71.57 
Per capita food expenditures a 
(US$/person) 
57.1 ± 35.75 72.5 ± 49.90 80.3 ± 55.75 
Per capita expenditures on clothes and 
shoes a (US$/person)** 
25.7 ± 22.57 45.3 ± 30.35 53.1 ± 32.52 
Per capita expenditures on services, 
health and education a (US$/person) 
9.2 ± 7.14 9.6 ± 7.07 10.9 ± 10.97 
Per capita expenditures on rent, house 
reparations and buying domestic 
appliances a (US$/person)** 
13.9 ± 22.54 16.7 ± 29.84 46.9 ± 64.07 
Total per capita expenditures a 
(US$/person)** 
133.8 ± 62.65 221.7 ± 101.88 353.7 ± 135.18 
Source: Own data collected among rural households being UBPC collective members in the provinces 
of Santiago de Cuba, Holguín and Las Tunas, Cuba 2008 
Notes: the results are shown as average ± standard deviation 
a Unofficial exchange rate for 2007-2008 of 24 Cuban pesos = 1 US$ (ECLAC,  2009) 
** significantly different with P > 0.01, Kruskall Wallis test 
 
44                                  Chapter 3. Poverty and food consumption in collective farms 
In addition to differences in expenditures, the relative poverty status of the households 
is linked to their private food production (Table 2). The most frequent production 
activities of the households are pigs, sheep, goats, and poultry, while few also have 
crop production. The poorest tercile has a significantly higher proportion of 
households that do not produce their own food, and therefore they rely more heavily 
on food rations that only cover a portion of the total monthly needs and on the legal or 
illegal food markets (Nova Gonzalez, 2008a; Togores González & García Álvarez, 
2004). The prices in these markets are usually much higher than prices for the 
rationed food sold in government outlets. Moreover, the better-off households of the 
sample produce almost ten times more value for home consumption than the 
households in the poorest tercile. As cash incomes are insufficient among the poorest 
groups, the results show that the poorest group consumes much less quantity and/or 
quality of food. The inequality in food consumption is not reflected in the fulfillment 
of other important needs. Per capita expenditures for services, health, and education 
are very low but do not show any differences between the groups, most likely as a 
result of public policies that offer free health and education to the population. Services 
such as electricity and water are also heavily subsidized by the state (Table 2). 
The segmented food markets and other sources of food in Eastern Cuba will be 
presented before further analyzing the food consumption patterns of the three groups. 
Table 3 shows the sources of some of the main food items consumed by the sample 
households. The first food source is the rationing system, where each person gets a 
provision of products at highly subsidized prices sold in state shops, covering around 
a third of the caloric and proteic monthly needs (Alvarez, 2004; Nova Gonzalez, 
2008a). Children, pregnant women, sick and elderly persons get additional items in 
the ration. For example, milk is only given to children younger than seven years old. 
Any additional milk consumed by the households comes from illegal markets, or can 
be theoretically bought in convertible currency in state shops. However, our 
observations and interviews during the field research confirm that no milk was offered 
in these shops in the three provinces studied. Moreover, not all items supposedly 
offered in the ration are available in reality, as in the case of beef and fish, or their 
availability fluctuates due to production and distribution problems, as in the cases of 
bread, pulses and poultry. The state-sponsored channel for ration food is therefore 
neither a reliable nor a sufficient source of food for rural households in the provinces 
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studied. Households have to either produce additional food by themselves or use their 
income to buy food from legal and illegal markets. 
 
Table 3: Main sources of food consumed by the households of UBPC members in the 
provinces of Santiago de Cuba, Holguín and Las Tunas, Cuba 2008 
Food type  Ration Agricultural 
market 
Home 
production 
UBPC 
production 
Illegal 
market 
Rice + + (c) + (b) (c)    
Bread and similar + +     
Pulses + + (c) + (c) + +  
Vegetables  + + + +  
Fruits  + + +  + 
Roots and tubers  + + + + +  
Eggs + + + + + + +  
Poultry + (c) + + (b) (c) + +   
Milk + +    + + 
Beef + (b) (c)    + + 
Pig, sheep or goat meat  + + + + +  
Meat-soybean mix + +     
Fish +    + + 
Sources: Observations and interviews by the authors, except for cells marked (b) (Alvarez, 2004; Añé 
Aguiloche, 2005; Nova Gonzalez, 2008a). 
Note: the cells show the relative importance (+ + is very important, and + is less important) of each 
source in supplying food for the consumption of the households as perceived by the authors based on 
observations and interviews, except for cells marked (c) (Alvarez, 2004; Añé Aguiloche, 2005; Nova 
Gonzalez, 2008a). The relative importance shown in the table is only for guidance and is not based on a 
representative survey. 
 
The agricultural market includes free markets and markets with maximum set prices, 
where both state farms and private producers are allowed to sell their produce. 
However, not all products are permitted in these markets and prices are usually much 
higher than the rationed ones (Alvarez, 2004; Nova Gonzalez, 2008a). For example, 
eggs in the agricultural market of the studied areas cost between 0.90 Cuban pesos per 
unit (Holguín) and two pesos per unit (Las Tunas), as compared to the 0.15 pesos per 
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rationed egg. Milk, beef and fish are strictly forbidden in agricultural markets, but are 
offered in the illegal market (Table 3). This market includes rationed products that are 
bartered or sold by the households, agricultural products sold without state 
permission, stolen goods, illegally slaughtered beef or illegally caught fish (Nova 
Gonzalez, 2008a). Apart from these markets, the studied households can also produce 
their own food, as shown in Table 2, or receive products from the UBPC collective 
where they work. The type and quantity of food offered by the UBPC depend on the 
collective farm production activities, and will be analyzed in detail in the next 
subsection (3.2).  
Our analysis of food acquisition and consumption patterns of rural households in three 
provinces of Eastern Cuba shows that households’ food access relies on different 
sources with widely variable prices and availability. The following patterns for food 
acquisition and consumption arise from the analysis of our primary data. The 
households, as expected, equally consume rationed food such as rice and bread, and 
this is unrelated to their poverty status (Table 4). The highest consumption frequency 
is for rice, closely followed by bread, which is consumed by almost all households 
during each of the past three days. On the other hand, more expensive food that can 
only be acquired in legal agricultural or illegal markets tends to be consumed less 
frequently by the poorer households. This is especially true for roots and tubers 
(considered a staple food in Cuba but not included in the ration), fruits and fresh 
vegetables (Table 4). This trend is also recognizable in the case of milk, by separating 
the households entitled to rationed milk because they have children of up to seven 
years of age. Our results (not shown in Table 4) confirm that significantly more of the 
better-off households consume illegal milk with daily frequency whereas rationed 
milk is consumed equally among the three groups.  
Better-off households consumed not only more value in terms of food, as was shown 
in the Table 2, but also significantly more food types (Table 4). The Diet Diversity 
index increases significantly with the relative wealth of the households. The poorer 
households consumed an average of seven different food types during the last three 
days prior to the household survey, while the medium and better-off households 
consumed an average of eight and nine different food types, respectively, in the same 
period. The households of the three groups have access to carbohydrates from grains 
and to animal and plant protein from the ration system, but better-off households 
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consume more vitamin-rich food items, such as fresh vegetables and fruits. A number 
of studies have shown that an increase in the diet diversity is highly correlated to a 
more balanced and better nutrition (Hatloy et al, 2000; Ruel, 2003). These results 
could reflect a wider nutrition problem in Cuba. Official statistics on the apparent 
consumption of macro and micronutrients in 2006 show that the population did not 
consume enough fat, essential fatty acids, vitamins B2 and B12, or niacin (ONE,  
2007). The importance of food production for the households is not limited to food 
consumption. The households with land for crops, space to raise small livestock, and 
feed availability, have also an additional source of income to cover other needs. For 
example, many of the interviewed households said they raise pigs in order to buy 
clothes, assets or to repair their houses.  
 
Table 4: Frequency of household consumption of different food types during the past 
three days, in the households of UBPC collective members in the provinces of 
Santiago de Cuba, Holguín and Las Tunas, Cuba 2008 
Food type Main source of food 
Poorest  
N: 57 
Medium 
N: 56 
Better-off 
N: 57 
Rice Ration 3.0 ± 0.31 3.0 ± 0.19 3.0 ± 0.08 
Pulses Ration 2.5 ± 0.74 2.6 ± 0.88 2.7 ± 0.55 
Bread Ration 2.9 ± 0.57 2.8 ± 0.69 2.9 ± 0.51 
Meat Ration and 
agricultural markets 
1.9 ± 1.15 2.0 ± 0.89 2.4 ± 0.70 
Fruits** Agricultural and 
illegal markets 
0.9 ± 1.31 1.1 ± 1.35 2.0 ± 1.21 
Fresh vegetables* Agricultural markets 
and UBPC a 
2.0 ± 1.26 2.6 ± 0.89 2.7 ± 0.64 
Roots and tubers ** Agricultural markets 
and UBPC a 
2.0 ± 1.26 2.8 ± 0.66 2.9 ± 0.48 
Fish Illegal markets 0.1 ± 0.37 0.2 ± 0.39 0.3 ± 0.58 
Source: Own data collected among rural households being UBPC collective members in the provinces 
of Santiago de Cuba, Holguín and Las Tunas, Cuba 2008 
Notes: the results are shown as average ± standard deviation 
a Crops from the UBPC can be supplied as in kind salary or sold to the households 
** significantly different with P > 0.01, Kruskall Wallis test 
* significantly different with P > 0.05, Kruskall Wallis test 
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As in the case of food, not all durable assets are related to poverty (Table 5), and this 
could be a result of the different sources of these assets. Assets received through 
government programs tend to be similar between the groups, while those that are only 
available in state shops that sell in convertible currency (CUC) are not. The poorer 
households have a significantly lower number of fans, radios and television sets. 
Other high value assets, such as DVDs, are only available through remittances 
(Eckstein, 2010) and the illegal market, and few of the sample households own them. 
 
Table 5: Durable assets of households of UBPC collective members in the provinces 
of Santiago de Cuba, Holguín and Las Tunas, Cuba 2008 
Number of Source of asset 
Poorest  
N: 57 
Medium 
N: 56 
Better-off 
N: 57 
Refrigerators State program 0.6 ± 0.50 0.8 ± 0.55 0.6 ± 0.55 
Electric kitchen State program 0.8 ± 0.59 0.9 ± 0.53 0.8 ± 0.42 
Television sets* State program / Shop in CUC 0.7 ± 0.44 1.0 ± 0.40 0.9 ± 0.46 
Fans** State shop in CUC 0.9 ± 0.82 1.7 ± 0.98 1.8 ± 1.08 
Radios / stereos** State shop in CUC 0.5 ± 0.50 0.8 ± 0.60 1.0 ± 0.54 
Source: Own data collected among rural households being UBPC collective members in the provinces 
of Santiago de Cuba, Holguín and Las Tunas, Cuba 2008 
Notes: the results are shown as average ± standard deviation 
* significantly different with P > 0.05, Kruskall Wallis test 
** significantly different with P > 0.01, Kruskall Wallis test 
 
In order to complement the quantitative information on the poverty status of the 
households, the respondents were also asked to rank their “life quality” on a scale 
from one to ten, and then to explain what they considered was affecting their life 
quality positively and negatively. The “life quality” reported in the three groups had 
an average of 4.9 to 5.5, and it does not show significant differences between the 
relative poverty groups. An unexpected result is that this subjective measure of life 
quality is negatively correlated with per capita expenditures. This result could be 
caused by negative perceptions of individual gain or positive perceptions of poverty 
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as being in line with communist ideology (Kreidl, 2000). However, when asked to 
enumerate the conditions that affect their quality of life, 63% of respondents 
mentioned insufficient salary or income, and 49% of respondents mentioned 
inadequate food access and quality as negatively affecting them. This seems to 
validate the quantitative results in this study regarding expenditures and food 
consumption.  
There is one aspect that seems to be extremely important for the households, but is not 
captured by the PCA analysis. The self-reported measure on life quality is highly 
correlated with the repair status of the dwelling that the household occupies as a 
residence, and 64% of respondents mentioned the quality, ownership, and state of the 
dwelling as affecting their life quality. Severe restrictions in the access to residential 
housing and building materials could explain that the conditions of the dwelling are 
not related with household expenditures or with the PCA index. Even if the better-off 
households have more available income they cannot invest it to improve their homes 
or move to a better one. The conditions of the dwelling do not differ between the three 
relative poverty groups, and an important proportion of them are either in bad state of 
repair or are built with low quality and non-durable materials. These results are in line 
with publications that view housing and food availability as the most pressing 
problems in Cuba (Brundenius, 2009; Álvarez & Máttar, 2004).  
3.2. Collective agricultural production and poverty 
In order to get a more complete outline of the links between collective agricultural 
production and household level wellbeing, the poverty index was explored for 
correlations with the UBPC’s production and resource use characteristics. Our 
correlation analysis shows that the relative poverty level of the households is neither 
correlated with the main production activity of the UBPC they belong to (i.e. milk 
and/or beef), nor to its profit as an indicator of economic performance (Table 6). 
Instead of this, the poverty index is significantly correlated with the secondary 
activities of the farms, for example with the diversification of the UBPC into small 
livestock husbandry for collective “self-consumption”, with crop production and with 
the land used for these “self-consumption” activities. In other words, working harder 
for the primary objective of the collective farm is not rewarded. Instead, those UBPC 
farms that allow members to use some of the land and their labor for “selfish” self-
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consumption activities and related sales of surplus are the ones with relatively better-
off members. Moreover, our results show that larger UBPC farms have in tendency 
poorer workers, which may indicate increasing management problems, for example an 
under exploitation of economies of scale related to increasing farm size and 
fragmentation.  
 
Table 6: Correlations between the household level poverty index of workers and their 
UBPC collective characteristics, provinces of Santiago de Cuba, Holguín and Las 
Tunas, Cuba 2008 
Collective farm variable 
Correlation 
Coefficient 
Significance 
(2-tailed) 
Number of small livestock production activitiesa 0.380** 0.000 
Total workers per crop area (persons/ha) -0.326** 0.001 
Total area dedicated to crops (ha) 0.304** 0.002 
Total crop production in 2007 (tons) 0.287** 0.003 
Total area of the UBPC (Ha) -0.232* 0.018 
Total beef produced by the UBPC in 2007 (tons) -0.030 Not Sign. 
Total milk produced by the UBPC in 2007 (1000 x liters) -0.009 Not Sign. 
Total profit of the UBPC in 2007 (pesos) 0.066 Not Sign. 
Average monthly salary in the UBPC in 2007 (pesos) 0.158 Not Sign. 
Source: Own data collected among rural households being members of 30 UBPC collectives in the 
provinces of Santiago de Cuba, Holguín and Las Tunas, Cuba 2008 
a Includes sheep, goats, pigs, poultry, rabbits and other small livestock 
** correlation significant with P > 0.01, Spearman’s rho 
* correlation significant with P > 0.05, Spearman’s rho 
 
Despite the fact that in the sample households the UBPC is the main occupation, the 
economic performance of the farm and the salary received by the workers do not 
show any correlation with the poverty status of the households. The average salary 
and the total annual profit of the farm depend strongly on the milk and beef 
production of the UBPC. But how does this money reach the households? The annual 
distribution of the farm’s profit is limited by strict regulations (Resolution Nr. 629, 
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2004) that effectively cap the maximum amount the workers receive. At the same 
time, UBPC farms that have annual losses are subsidized by the state, so workers 
almost never stop being paid. Both mechanisms uncouple the economic performance 
of the collective farm from the households’ poverty status. Moreover, the salary 
received by the workers covers only a fraction of the households’ needs. The average 
salary in the studied collectives was 18.4 US$ per month in 2007 (442 Cuban pesos), 
and showed no difference between the three poverty groups studied. The household 
income coming from the UBPC salary would cover between 68% (for the poorer 
group) to 33% (for the better-off group) of the total annual expenditures. 
In contrast to the lack of importance of the main activities, the number of secondary 
activities, the resources used in these activities and their productive outcomes, are all 
highly correlated to the household’s relative poverty (Table 6). The results also 
suggest that land used for collective food production is scarce, as shown by the 
negative correlation between the number of workers per hectare of food crops grown, 
and the poverty status of collective members. Per capita food either sold or given as 
in-kind salary to the UBPC workers has a big variation in crops and meat from small 
ruminants and pigs. However, these figures may be underestimated as the principal 
author observed during her field visits that crops were sold informally, and were not 
reported in the general bookkeeping. Besides from being consumed, the products 
received by the households could be bartered or resold by the households, thus being 
converted in an additional income source. Interviewed experts expressed their concern 
that collective resources for crop production (fertilizer, working implements, seeds) 
are frequently taken illicitly by the workers. In fact, the value of food produced 
privately in the households is positively correlated with the total number of collective 
“self-consumption” activities and the amount of land used for collective crop 
production, suggesting that these collective resources are being used for private food 
production. 
Despite the apparent significance that secondary activities have for the collective 
workers, the collective farm has restricted access to credits, production inputs and 
other resources aimed at these secondary objectives, as well as a limited allowance of 
land for crops. Apart from controlling the extent of the “self-consumption” collective 
activities, the state also ties the provision of production inputs to the sale of produce 
to state food distribution firms. This seems to be more pronounced in the case of 
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crops, where the average share sold to the state in our sample of UBPC is around 40% 
of the production. However, two of the UBPC declared that they sold 99% and 100% 
of their crop production to the state. In the case of small livestock production, the 
share sold to the state seems to be lower (nine to ten percent in the case of pigs and 
small ruminants, and nothing in the case of poultry and eggs).  
4. Poverty and incentives in Cuban collective agriculture 
Most poverty studies identify education and other human capital variables as 
determinant for the poverty status of households (Henry et al, 2003; Sahn & Stifel, 
2000; Zeller et al, 2006). However, in the present study these variables appear not to 
be related to the relative poverty of households. This may be only valid in the studied 
sample and could be the consequence of education and employment policies in Cuba. 
On one hand, most of the adults have a medium to high education level, while on the 
other hand, there are no important differences regarding their employment 
opportunities or the potential salary they earn, especially in rural areas. These results 
contrast with poverty conditions reported in the city of Havana, where a higher 
differentiation of education levels and employment opportunities is to be found (Añé 
Aguiloche, 2005). Other variables also show a different behavior in Cuba when 
compared with other countries. The consumption of roots and tubers is positively 
correlated with the wealth of the household, whereas in other developing countries 
they are often found to be inferior foods (Musgrove, 1985; Teklu, 1996). This could 
be a result of cultural differences in terms of food preferences. However, we suppose 
that it is more likely a consequence of the segmentation of food markets into highly 
controlled state markets where roots and tubers are not sold, and legal as well as 
illegal markets with differential access by households. Likewise, the ownership of 
certain assets and the quality of the dwelling show patterns that are different from 
other published results (Sahn & Stifel, 2003; Zeller et al, 2006). In Cuba, certain 
consumption assets are provided by the state whereas others need to be purchased in 
legal markets with convertible currency or in illegal markets with convertible 
currency or US dollars, usually from remittances (Eckstein, 2010). These differences 
are obviously a result of the segmentation and restriction of Cuban markets for 
consumer assets, for housing and for building materials, which cause –compared to 
other countries– the unusual dissociation between some of these variables from either 
household expenditures or poverty index.  
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The relative poverty status of the households being members or workers in the UBPC 
collective is found to heavily depend on their access to private and collective 
resources for food production that can be legally or illegally used for home 
consumption and sale. While salaries from the UBPC farm constitute an egalitarian 
income source, our analysis shows that they are insufficient to cover even the basic 
needs of the households. The studied households must complement their food 
allowance either in markets that are far more expensive than the rationed one, or with 
home and collective production. The food rationing system also constitutes an 
egalitarian nutrition source for the households that guarantees a minimum 
consumption, but those with additional food sources are found to have better food 
security in terms of quantity, quality and diversity of the diet. These additional food 
sources may become even more important in the near future, as changes in the 
rationing system have been announced that seem to signal its progressive elimination 
(Espinosa Chepe, 2009; Galvez Chiu, 2010).  
Despite their importance for the households, the state puts severe limits to resources 
used in the self-provision activities. For example, private land is not easily available 
for households as land markets are restricted. On the other hand, the collective farms 
are only allowed to produce food for self-consumption if this does not compete with 
the main activities of the UBPC, and are required to sell part of this production to the 
state (Resolution Nr. 629, 2004). Why does the state restrict these self-provisioning 
activities? The apparent objective is to protect the main activities of the UBPC farm, 
which in the case under study are milk and beef production. Interviewed authorities 
and local experts consider that the importance of the cattle UBPC farms is based 
exclusively on their capacity to produce milk and beef, i.e. their “social objective”. 
Since the main activities are designed to feed the rationing system that distributes 
these products to the rest of the country, any other activity that may compete with 
them in terms of land, labor and other production resources, is –according to our 
interviews– officially viewed as being against the interests of the society. The risk that 
the collective secondary activities compete with the main activities is expressed in 
legal regulations issued (Resolution Nr. 629, 2004), and in the discourse and behavior 
of local authorities and agriculture officials. 
However, the policies restricting secondary activities in favor of the main activities, 
added to salary regulations establishing upper limits to the potential earnings of 
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workers and lower limits even if the UBPC does not deliver to the “social objective”, 
result in a disconnection of the farm’s performance for the state and the wellbeing of 
the households being employed by the UBPC. The current set of incentives neither 
helps to achieve the “social objective” of the state to safeguard the production of 
critical ration foods such as beef and milk, nor increases the welfare of rural 
households in the selected provinces in the poorest part of the country. Our study 
shows that there is simply no link (positive or negative) between the occupation of 
workers in the cattle units and the cash or in-kind salary they receive. The lack of 
working incentives in cattle production is added to the strong incentives to participate 
in other activities whose products reach directly the homes of the workers. The 
resulting competition, in terms of labor and resources, is played both in the space of 
collective agriculture between the two types of activities, and in the private sphere, 
between home and collective production. This competition, also linked with labor 
absenteeism, has been frequently described as a common problem in collective 
agriculture (Deininger, 1995; Tria Kerkvliet, 2005). The lack of work incentives could 
also explain the constant need of hired workforce and the external work brigades 
mobilized from schools, other provinces, or even from criminals and unemployed in 
re-education programs. The policies in place not only hurt agricultural production by 
not providing the right incentives to workers, but also lose the opportunity of 
improving the wellbeing of the households. The erratic performance and huge 
production problems of UBPC farms appear to be in part the result of these policies. 
Our study suggests that the latent reform pathway begun in 2008 in Cuba’s 
agricultural policy should be accelerated. This reform was commenced on an 
experimental basis by the Cuban government, and includes changes towards 
agriculture with more self-employed farming and incentive-compatible salaries for 
workers (Decree-Law Nr. 259, 2008; Mesa Lago, 2008; Resolution Nr. 09/2008, 
2008). Reform of the land, labor and agricultural commodity markets in other 
countries, such as Vietnam and China, towards liberalized commodity markets, rights 
of movement of labor to better-earning jobs, and individual user rights for land (if not 
full property rights for land) resulted in an increase of welfare and a reduction of 
poverty (Montalvo & Ravallion, 2009; Ravallion & van de Walle, 2004). Following 
similar reforms in Cuba would be a big step towards increasing welfare of the rural 
households and the wellbeing and food consumption of households in Cuban cities 
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and rural areas. Liberalized markets for land, agricultural commodity and labor could 
better achieve individual and social objectives. 
Our study of poverty and food security of rural households in Cuba and its 
relationship with agricultural production shows interesting implications not only for 
future poverty studies in the country, but also for agricultural policies and 
development projects. Cuba’s government would gain an important insight on its 
agricultural and welfare problems if more socio-economic studies were allowed or 
promoted in the country (Espina Prieto, 2008a). Poverty studies in the country are 
limited to income calculations based on either primary or secondary information on 
public or UBPC salaries, pensions and other permitted sources of income. The 
researchers usually recognize the importance of additional income from private 
employment, remittances, or the production and sale of crops and livestock, yet these 
sources are not considered in income calculations (Añé Aguiloche, 2005; Leyva 
Remón, 2006; Togores González, 2004). The results obtained in this study suggest 
that at least some of these activities, like home production, are of great importance to 
define poverty and inequality at household level, even in relatively homogeneous 
groups like the one under study. By disregarding them, the income at household level 
is underestimated, and main income sources are overlooked. Ignoring these income 
sources in official statistics and in the analysis of wellbeing implies to underrate or 
even forget promising pathways for agricultural and rural development in Cuba. 
Without proper research, the apparent incompatibility and conflicts in incentives 
between private and collective agricultural production are ignored.  
5. Conclusions and outlook 
The results presented in this study on rural households and collectives in selected 
provinces of Eastern Cuba bring to light several facts and policy implications that 
have been written about but rarely documented and supported through primary data 
and empirical evidence. We derive a number of implications from our research 
regarding the wellbeing of the rural population and the reform of agricultural policy 
with respect to land, labor and commodity markets. These topics are clearly of great 
importance in a country that prides itself of its achievements in social policy while 
trying to increase the quantity and quality of food production. Based on the empirical 
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evidence and statistical analysis in the paper, our conclusions and policy implications 
are summarized below. 
First, relative poverty, diversity in food consumption, and overall self-reported quality 
of life in the households of workers of collective farms in selected provinces of 
Eastern Cuba, are associated with the households’ access to food for own 
consumption or sale either from own home production or from the state-sanctioned 
“self-consumption” activities of their UBPC farms. Relative poverty, food diversity, 
and quality of life are found to have no association at all with the economic or 
productive performance in the main activities of the UBPC farm.  
Therefore, and as a second conclusion, severe incentive problems exist in Cuban 
agriculture. Workers are not rewarded for better or more work in the UBPC 
cooperatives, and the land they can devote to private and collective production for 
home consumption or resale in local markets is restricted by the state. While the main 
activities of the UBPC farms in terms of beef and milk production are considered 
fundamental by the state, collective and private food production for home 
consumption are the most important for the household’s quality of life and food 
consumption. Both collective and private food production compete for labor and 
resources with the main production activities of the collectives, in this case beef and 
milk. To correct these incentive problems, the emerging reforms –albeit on an 
experimental and highly state-controlled basis– should be accelerated towards a 
system with greater private incentives and liberalized markets for land, labor, and 
agricultural commodities, especially food. 
Third, the further study of agricultural production in Cuba, its institutional setting, and 
its link with rural poverty, food security and well-being are vital for the much needed 
policy reforms if the country wants to decrease its dependence on imported food while 
maintaining its social achievements, for example in the area of education and access 
to primary health care. Local and national authorities would gain much from the 
insights of further research, as would NGOs and international development agencies.  
Fourth, it is important to point out that, because of the representativity problems of the 
data used in this study, the results should not be extended to other producer groups or 
regions in Cuba. It is of course regrettable that local political influence did not allow 
us to draw a random sample of UBPC cooperatives and their household members. Our 
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suspicion is –but this is only a suspicion– that the final sample presented in this paper 
is upwardly biased towards better-performing UBPC farms and households with a 
relatively better standard of living. However, this remains a suspicion until 
representative surveys of rural households by independent researchers are allowed in 
the future. We nonetheless believe that the results shown here are indicative of the 
severe incentive problems in Cuba’s food and agricultural system and the apparent 
social differentiation of rural households with respect to access to land resources and 
markets for agricultural products. 
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1. Introduction 
Besides from resources and technology, agricultural production depends on the 
institutional setup governing production and marketing. Institutions shape incentives 
and constraints of economic actors, and therefore economic performance. In the case 
of agriculture, for example, individual property rights over land have been recognized 
as an institution that results in higher investments and productivity. Lack of rural land 
markets, insecurity on land tenure and collective agriculture, on the other hand, may 
lead to inefficient agricultural production and resource misuse (Acemoglu and 
Johnson 2005, 988; Deininger and Songqing Jin 2003, 866-867; Feder and Feeny 
1991, 146; Markussen 2008, 2286; Pingali and Xuan 1992, 712; Schlager and Ostrom 
1992, 256-257). Considering the importance of agricultural production in a world with 
increasing food problems, it is imperative to explore the reasons behind the 
permanence of institutions that result in reduced agricultural output and productivity. 
Institutions may change slowly or fail to change because of the economic or social 
cost of changing them (especially the informal ones), as well as historical factors and 
path dependence (North 1990, 73-104; North 1998, 14-15). The theoretical framework 
used in this study, however, focuses on political power dynamics and their interaction 
with changes in the economic institutions (Acemoglu and Robinson 2000, 126; 
Acemoglu and Robinson 2008, 268-269). In order to explain the processes behind the 
limited reforms in the agricultural sector of Cuba, we borrow from literature on 
institutional change, political economy, and authoritarian regimes. 
Cuba’s agricultural sector provides an interesting case study to explore the persistence 
of inefficient institutions. This sector is comprised by a mixture of producer groups 
with different user rights over land, a variety of organization types, and limited 
markets. In addition, it presents huge production problems, to the point that Cuba 
relies almost exclusively on food imports that have steadily grown over the years 
(Mesa Lago 2008, 12; Peters 2009, 4). The country’s economic and political 
institutional setup, despite few changes, has survived a number of economic crises in 
a way that has surprised critics. There has been much discussion over the changes that 
Cuba has implemented as a result of the collapse of the Soviet Union in the early 
1990s, the economic and social consequences of these changes and the expectations of 
a further transition to a market economy, or even to a democracy. Most published 
research describes the reforms adopted by Cuba and their economic, social and 
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productive consequences, and predicts or suggests possible paths of transition based 
on different political or economic scenarios (Brundenius 2009, 31; Deere 1997, 649; 
March-Poquet 2000, 91; Xianglin 2007, 93). Another line of publications offers 
policy prescriptions dealing with development paths that Cuba could take (or is 
desired to take), but without exploring the constraints to the adoption of these changes 
(Alvarez 2004b, 722-733; Royce 2004, 53).  
Cuba’s transition is described as one with a limited number of reforms in key sectors 
that have been adopted in order to respond to external shocks. The reforms included a 
limited opening to international investments, partial dismantling of the state farms that 
dominated in the agricultural sector, and a monetary reform, all designed to increase 
the flow of foreign currency into the country and to protect the population from 
massive food shortages (March-Poquet 2000, 109; Xianglin 2007, 95-98). The limited 
reforms were enough for some economic recovery and growth, and apparently 
avoided a political collapse by altering the institutional framework in such a way that 
the political elite maintains the power by rigorously controlling who gains and who 
loses with the reforms (Corrales 2004, 56-57). The social services offered by the 
political elite to the general population serve only partially to legitimize the regime, 
but are not enough to avoid political unrest (Yamaoka 2004, 331-332). The 
government uses repression to control dissent on one side, and on the other, rewards a 
limited group of supporters with highly profitable business opportunities in the 
reformed sectors (Corrales 2004, 56-57). In the agricultural sector, the economic 
institutions controlling a large part of production and marketing either have changed 
on a limited way, or the changes have been partially reversed (de Miranda Parrondo 
2005, 9-10). It is not clear what is behind these partial institutional changes and 
reversal of reforms, and the hypotheses advanced for the overall economy of the 
island do not seem to explain the evolution in the agricultural sector. 
The questions addressed in this paper centre around the evolution of economic 
institutions in the agricultural sector of Cuba, and the reasons behind the existence of 
present day institutions. In order to understand this evolution, we analyze four reforms 
or policy changes in the agricultural sector and their significance on the political 
power and interests of the groups that interact in this sector. Most of these 
developments have been extensively described in the literature, but we want to look at 
them through a different lens, the one of theories of institutional change. The interest 
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is not only to examine the past, but also to look at the future by discussing the options 
that could improve the performance of the agricultural sector, and their consequences 
in other areas. The paper is organized as follows: First, we will present the theoretical 
framework used in this study. Then, the different groups that hold some type of 
political power in the agricultural sector will be described in terms of their 
characteristics and the origin of their political power. Next, several developments and 
reforms in the agricultural sector will be examined from the point of view of the 
impact these had on the power balance between the different groups in the sector. 
Finally, we will present concluding remarks. 
2. Institutions and change in agriculture 
The processes linked to institutional change have received much attention, and there is 
a wealth of publications dealing, for example, with the transition from a socialist to a 
market economy. Most of the communist countries followed reform paths that varied 
from changes restricted to their economic institutions, as in China and Vietnam, to 
others that experienced as well a radical alteration of the political institutions, as in the 
case of some of the Eastern European countries (Kornai 2000, 33). These transition 
countries, moreover, have reformed their agriculture following various pathways with 
contrasting results in agricultural production, economic growth and poverty in rural 
areas (Rozelle and Swinnen 2004, 443-445; Swinnen 1999, 658-659). China and 
Vietnam slowly decollectivized their rural areas, introduced private property rights 
over land, and promoted family based production, boosting their agricultural 
productivity and output and decreasing rural poverty (De Brauw et al. 2004, 457-458; 
Mcmillan and Naughton 1992, 137-138; Pingali and Xuan 1992, 697-699). On the 
other hand, the former Soviet Union and the Eastern European countries experienced 
different degrees of rapid changes to their land property regimes and opening of 
markets that led to an initial slump in output followed by improvements in 
productivity (Csaki and Lerman 1997, 443-445; Rozelle and Swinnen 2004, 449). 
The theoretical framework used in this study stresses the interplay between political 
and economic institutions. Political institutions and the power balance in societies 
influence which economic institutions will be selected. That is because the economic 
institutions govern not only the creation of wealth, but also its distribution between 
different groups (Acemoglu et al. 2004, 2-10; Acemoglu and Robinson 2008, 268). In 
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highly unequal circumstances, the elite will try to choose a set of economic 
institutions that allocates most of the created wealth to them, and not necessarily the 
ones that maximize total wealth (Acemoglu et al. 2004, 2-10; Acemoglu and 
Robinson 2008, 268; Bates 1998, 237-239). These resources and wealth are not only 
important in the present, but they also carry with them the future potential of 
maintaining their political power. This mechanism means that the balance of political 
power will determine not only the economic institutions but also the political 
institutions in the future (Acemoglu et al. 2004, 2-10; Acemoglu and Robinson 2008, 
268). 
On the other hand, changes in the economic institutions, economic crises or the 
introduction of technological innovations can cause alterations in the power balance 
that trigger changes in the political sphere (Acemoglu et al. 2004, 6; Geddes 1999, 
119, 134-135; Haggard and Kaufman 1997, 266-269). Political elites will try to block 
changes in the economic institutions or the introduction of new technologies, if they 
threaten their political power and their future economic advantages (Acemoglu and 
Robinson 2000, 126-130). Moreover, the political elites must garner support to avoid 
being overthrown during crises. For example, during economic crises, the support of 
the regime will not depend on the economic growth or performance per se, but on 
how much the regime is able to give to its supporters, while maintaining their coercive 
capacity (Geddes 1999, 138). 
Political elites are not the only actors in the policy process. Consumers, farmers and 
other groups outside agriculture can push for, support or block reforms if they have 
enough political power and they consider that these reforms will benefit (or hurt) their 
interests. Moreover, even a group with little influence can successfully push for 
changes if no other group opposes it (Swinnen 2009, 1528-1529). It has been argued 
that the reforms in the Soviet Union’s agricultural sector were blocked by farm 
workers that feared their income would decrease if the state farms were turned into 
worker-owned collectives. On the other side, Chinese collective workers pushed for 
reforms because it would mean an improvement in their access to food (Rozelle and 
Swinnen 2009, 280-281). 
What determines the political power that a given group has? On one hand, political 
institutions such as the constitution and laws, determine the constraints and incentives 
of the elites and other members of a society, and result in the de jure political power 
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of these groups. On the other hand, groups that own resources also have political 
power, even if this de facto political power is not written in any law. The de facto 
political power can be expressed in the threat of revolts, and in the active or in the 
passive and unorganized blocking or transformation of reforms pushed by the elite 
(Acemoglu and Robinson 2006, 325-326; Rozelle and Swinnen 2009, 278-279; Tria 
Kerkvliet 2005, 234-236). For example, peasants in China and Vietnam slowly 
corroded the collectivization efforts by the elite, eventually making it impossible to 
maintain this policy. Without any organized political manifestation, the actions and 
omissions of these groups achieved changes at local and then higher official levels. 
Changes in the factions in power eventually enabled the legalization of the 
decollectivization in agriculture, but this happened when, for example, around 90% of 
Chinese villages were already in fact decollectivized (Rozelle and Swinnen 2009, 
277; Tria Kerkvliet 2005, 237). The political influence and the interests of the 
different groups change with time due to technological innovations, major economic 
crises, and changes in the socio-economic characteristics of the groups (Swinnen 
2009, 1528-1529). 
3. Political power and the evolution of Cuba’s agricultural 
sector 
We argue that the reform path in Cuba’s agricultural sector can be partly explained by 
changes in the political power and interests of several groups that coexist in the sector, 
including the political elite, the bureaucrats that control agricultural services and food 
distribution, the agricultural producers, and the consumers. These groups were 
identified using information gathered during two visits to the country (the first one 
from October 2007 to March 2008, and the second one in April 2009), and 
supplemented with published research, laws and regulations, official statistics, and 
newspaper articles from international, Cuban official and dissident media.  
But who are the groups with political power in Cuba’s agricultural sector, and which 
conflicts have arisen between them? The political elite has almost all the political de 
jure power. Additionally, this group controls a repressive apparatus and most of the 
resources in the country. The elite controls the access of its supporters to high-earning 
activities either in the dollarized parallel economy or in local business opportunities 
(Corrales 2004, 50-51). The political system of Cuba can be defined as an 
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authoritarian one-party regime, where only one political party is allowed. Despite the 
existence of a very strong leader, the party exercises at least some power over the 
policies of the country (Geddes 1999, 124). In the classical socialist system, power is 
concentrated in the hands of the communist party, and party and government function 
as one entity permeating and controlling all activities in the country (Kornai 1992, 33-
39). The interest of the political elite is to stay in power, and can use different 
strategies to gain support or repress dissent (Bates 1998, 237-238; Geddes 1999, 125, 
134). 
The second group that calls our attention consists of bureaucrats and local cadres that 
are in charge of the agricultural marketing and distribution chains, both for inputs and 
outputs, and administratively control (totally or partially) most of the country’s 
agricultural land. Moreover, they are suspected to have an important participation in 
illegal markets, as these are supplied by products diverted from official channels 
(Ritter 2006, 6-7). The political elite controls other groups in society through the 
bureaucrats, as these are in command of permissions, administrative punishment and 
payments of agricultural producers. Kornai (1992, 40-45) considers that the leaders, 
the communist party and the bureaucracy are a monolithic entity with the same 
interests but with power distributed hierarchically. However, it can be discussed that 
bureaucrats may have different interests and political de facto power as compared to 
the elite. The interests of bureaucrats and local cadres are to protect the rents and 
political capital they obtain from their offices (Bates 1998, 237; Rozelle and Swinnen 
2009, 281-282). The political elite is interested in retaining power, and this may 
require improving economic conditions in order to gain or maintain political support, 
especially during crises. When the interests of bureaucrats and the elite are not 
aligned, conflicts between them may arise.  
Cuba’s private producers, the third group, have a political power based not only on 
their resources and food production potential, but also on their participation in the 
communist party as an organized lobby group. Private producers owned or occupied 
around 27% of Cuba’s agricultural land in 2007, and owned almost 60% of the cattle 
at the end of 2009 (ONE 2009, Table 9.1; ONE 2010b, Table 2.35). Most of them are 
also organized in the ANAP (National Association of Small Producers), who has a 
representative in the highest levels of the political communist bureau. Their active and 
organized participation in the communist party gives producers some political de jure 
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power. Their de facto power is exercised by withholding, destroying or illegally 
selling their agricultural products, sometimes even forcing the authorities to negotiate.  
The political power of the two last groups arises from very different sources. In the 
case of producers, it depends on the ownership or use rights over land and other 
productive resources, and in the case of the bureaucrats, on legal and administrative 
prerogatives granted by the political elite. More important even, private producers 
would win if reforms towards market economy are applied, while local bureaucrats 
would lose their political power with these reforms. The bureaucrats have therefore a 
strong incentive to block any changes in the direction of a market economy, and since 
they are responsible for the implementation of reforms defined by the political elite, 
they have the power to alter their functioning, to block or delay their application. 
The political power of the private producers stems partly from their potential to turn 
other groups (especially the consumers) against the political elite. The consumers 
(mainly in the city of Havana) also have power over the political elite, coming from 
the threat of unrest voiced in the limelight of ministries and international media. This 
de facto political power is evident from the strategy of the elite to allocate more 
resources such as food and shops to the population of the city of Havana than to other 
smaller cities or rural areas, and to respond with changes in policies when threatened 
with revolt (Deere 1997, 661; Marshall 1998, 278, 281-282). Despite the lack of 
legally recognized civic or consumer groups, the support or opposition from 
consumers during food crises can have an important effect over the elite’s actions. 
Once we have an overview of who are the main groups that interact in the agricultural 
sector, we will analyze how the political power and the interests of these four groups 
have changed over time, and how these changes have affected the performance of the 
agricultural sector. The analysis centres on the changes in the distribution of resources 
between the four groups (related to their de facto political power) and the political 
institutions in the sector (related to the de jure political power of each group). For this 
analysis, we have chosen some of the main events in the agricultural sector in the last 
50 years. The first one stretches over 20 years, beginning with the triumph of the 26th 
of July Movement and the establishment of a new communist government. During 
this time, the agricultural sector was reorganized and its main producer groups were 
defined. The second event is related to the brief legalization of open agricultural 
markets in the 1980s. The third event is what some authors identify as the beginning 
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of the transition period towards a market economy, when major changes in the 
agricultural sector fuelled expectations of a mass privatization of land. The last event 
studied is the recent and ongoing set of reforms advanced by the government from 
2007 onwards. 
3.1. State farms and collectivization (1960s-1970s) 
The agricultural sector of Cuba has always been highly unequal and characterized by 
the coexistence of smallholders and big landowners. This inequality did not change 
with the victory of the revolution. On one side, the new elite expropriated the huge 
plantations and cattle farms belonging to the previous political and economic elite, in 
order to create large state farms. Around 400.000 workers of these farms were 
converted from day labourers to state employees with higher salaries and income 
security. On the other side, property rights over land were given to smallholders 
(Alvarez 2004a, 32-36; Kay 1988, 3-5). The initial promise of the revolutionaries was 
to distribute the expropriated land, however, the preferences for economies of scale 
and the need to control the resources meant that state farms were favoured over their 
fragmentation and the creation of a large and powerful private sector (Alvarez 2004a, 
32). After the Second Agrarian Reform of 1963, between 70 and 76% of the land was 
under state control, while private smallholders controlled the remaining 24-30% (Kay 
1988, 5).  
Smallholders and landless peasants actively participated in or supported the guerrilla 
struggle that led the present government to power. Their political support was 
rewarded with land property rights and a radical improvement of the living conditions 
and education opportunities in the rural areas. Moreover, they were given political 
voice through an organization of small farmers. The National Association of Small 
Producers (ANAP) was created in 1961, in part as a pressure group to push for the 
improvement of the rural communities and to protect the interests of its members 
(Alvarez 2004a, 39; Álvarez Licea 2001, 83-84). However, members are required to 
support the revolutionary government, and ANAP is at the same time a lobby group 
that advances the political and economic policies of the government, as is usual in 
classic socialist systems (Alvarez 2004a, 39; Blutstein et al. 1971, 316-317; Kornai 
1992, 39-40, 45). 
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Despite the fact that authorities formally recognized the private land rights of 
smallholders and they were given a political voice, other forms of controlling this 
sector were soon devised. This was especially true in the case of perceived political 
opponents, when the state expropriated land and evicted peasants to punish active or 
passive political dissent (Alvarez 2004a, 37-38; González 2003, 700-701; Kay 1988, 
7). The state also pushed for the incorporation of private producers in the large state 
farm system, either by inviting them to join nearby farms, or by forced sales 
(González 2003, 700-701; Kay 1988, 6-7). The state retained the rights of first offer 
over land, and limited inheritance to family members who had worked the land 
previously (Kay 1988, 21-22; Pavó Acosta 2008, 3-4). Moreover, the family plots for 
home consumption of state farm workers were reduced (Kay 1988, 6). 
The political elite also promoted the association of the smallholders in credit and 
service cooperatives (CCS) and collective farms (CPA), as these organizations were 
easier to monitor and control (Kay 1988, 20-22). Moreover, all commerce and 
services, including agricultural inputs and outputs, were expropriated and eventually 
controlled by the political elite (Blutstein et al. 1971, 315-316; Burchardt 2002, 57). 
During the 1960s and 1970s, the new elite consolidated its political power with the 
help of the bureaucrats that came to have control of most of the country’s economic 
activities through planning and assignment of resources. The bureaucrats and the 
communist party also served the purposes of controlling the society and repressing 
political dissent (Dilla 1999, 230-231). The smallholders were forced to sell their 
produce to the state at low prices. Credits, agricultural inputs, machinery and access to 
new technologies like irrigation were used as incentives to push farmers to 
collectivize their lands. The result was that dispersed farmers and CCSs had less 
access to production resources than CPAs, while state farms received the majority of 
the investments (Alvarez and Puerta 1994, 1665; González 2003, 701). These 
measures had the intention of limiting the political power of private producers vis-à-
vis the state by decreasing their property and user rights over their land and produce, 
and by limiting their potential to grow and accumulate wealth. 
Which impacts did these changes have on agricultural production? The first years of 
the new government saw a slump in the output of almost all crops, while cattle was 
slaughtered due to the increased land tenure insecurity. Production eventually 
recovered, as large investments were made on mechanization and modernization of 
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production (Blutstein et al. 1971, 308-313; Kay 1988, 33-34). Despite the efforts of 
the state to suppress private farming, the percentage of agricultural land in private 
lands (including dispersed farmers, CCSs and CPAs) oscillated around 20% until the 
early 1990s. One of the reasons may be that even with limited access to production 
resources and services, the non-state sector consistently outdid the state farms in terms 
of productivity even when state farms had most of the resources and better 
technology. Private production fed not only the state’s food distribution system, 
especially with vegetables, fruits, roots and tubers, but also the export markets of 
sugarcane, coffee, and tobacco (Alvarez and Puerta 1994, 1664-1670, 1672-1673; 
Deere and Meurs 1992, 829; González 2003, 702-703). The political elite was willing 
to sacrifice part of this production potential in order to constrain the accumulation of 
political power and wealth by the private farmers. However, they were obviously not 
prepared to force the collectivization or the expropriation of all the land, as other 
communist countries did with tragic consequences (Kornai 1992, 77-78). 
In summary, the smallholders gained political power by the recognition of their rights 
over land and their organization in ANAP, but the political elite tried repeatedly to 
minimize this power by limiting these property rights using expropriation and 
collectivization, and by curtailing both the productive potential of the farmers and 
their re-investment capacity. The state farm workers (previously part-time labourers in 
the private large plantations and farms) improved their wellbeing and security when 
they turned into state employees, but did not gain any political power as this was 
transferred to the elite and the bureaucracy. The bureaucracy came to have control 
over all production decision making and the distribution of benefits to other 
producers. The state farm system, despite their preferential access to resources and 
technology, was less productive than the private farmers. 
3.2. Free peasant’s agricultural markets –MLC– (1980s) 
The first experiment of the Cuban communist government with free markets started in 
1980, and lasted only 6 years. The Free Peasant’s Markets (MLC) were restricted to 
the participation of private cooperatives and smallholders that were allowed to sell 
their produce after honouring quotas with the state-run distribution system (Alvarez 
2004a, 64; Marshall 1998, 277-278). The establishment of these markets was 
motivated, on one side, by the poor production of state agriculture and the stagnation 
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of private production during the 1970s. On the other side, there was excess monetary 
liquidity due to the scarcity of consumer goods and a black market with extremely 
high food prices. The scarcity of consumer goods, the low quality of state-produced 
food, and the high prices in the black market caused growing inequality and 
frustration in the population, and eventually led to unrest and mass emigration (Deere 
and Meurs 1992, 828-829; Marshall 1998, 278; Rosenberg 1992, 66). The unrest was 
nationally and internationally evident in 1980 as more than 10.000 persons tried to get 
political asylum in the Peruvian embassy, and as the government unilaterally opened 
the border leading to the Mariel boatlift that saw around 120.000 Cubans migrating to 
USA (Hoffmann 2005, 440). 
A struggle within the governing elite preceded the introduction of the markets. A 
faction supported them as they considered that opening markets would decrease food 
prices in comparison with the black market, decrease excess liquidity, and stimulate 
private agricultural production. Provincial and national leaders, on the contrary, 
opposed the markets as they feared losing the control over the private sector. The 
conflict resulted in the opening of extremely restricted and small-scale markets 
(Espinosa 1995, 56; Marshall 1998, 278-279; Rosenberg 1992, 60-65). 
Private producers responded very well to the opening of the MLC markets, and 
agricultural production, sales to the state and food quality increased dramatically as a 
result of improved incentives. On the other hand, the markets failed to lower the 
prices of agricultural goods (Alvarez 2004a, 64-65; Deere and Meurs 1992, 831; Kay 
1988, 10). There is little information of the impact of the free markets in the economic 
performance of the private producers. However, a study conducted on 1991 found that 
household income was much higher for private individual farmers followed by CPA 
farmers, while the poorest households were those of state farm workers (Deere et al. 
1995, 217). Regulations pertaining to land sales and the hiring of labour, as well as 
policies limiting the access to machinery and production resources, meant that 
although private producers could increase their personal wealth through the 
participation in the free markets, they could not improve the future production 
potential of their farms (Rosenberg 1992, 71). 
The failure in decreasing food prices caused opposition by consumers who could not 
afford to buy the goods sold in these markets. Private producers and intermediaries 
were accused of earning large profits, increasing the opposition from the political elite 
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to this newly empowered group (Kay 1988, 29; Marshall 1998, 279). There was also 
opposition by organized CPAs to the free markets due to their “debilitating” effect on 
collective farms. This effect was evident as fewer farmers were willing to join the 
collectives as a result of improved incentives in their individual farms, against which 
the CPAs could not compete (Deere and Meurs 1992, 834; Kay 1988, 29).  
The free markets were only eliminated in 1986, but since 1982 their functioning was 
affected by more bureaucratic controls and permission requirements, higher taxes and 
restricted participation of the CPA farms. Individual farmers were taxed more heavily 
and eventually all excess production of the CPAs was channelled to the state-
controlled parallel market that had been functioning previously, instead of to the MLC 
markets (Deere and Meurs 1992, 833; Marshall 1998, 280). While the MLC were 
reduced, the state-controlled parallel markets received contributions from the state 
farms and private CPA farms. The parallel markets increased their offer of 
agricultural products at controlled prices, and the state avoided facing rejection by 
consumers when the MLC free markets were eventually closed in 1986. At the same 
time, production was encouraged in the politically and ideologically preferred CPA 
farms (Deere and Meurs 1992, 835). 
The creation and elimination of the MLC markets exposed the interplay between 
political and economic interests in Cuba. Opponents to the markets managed to limit 
their scope in such a way that their functioning was greatly impaired and they could 
not reach their objectives of lowering food prices. They feared the empowerment of 
the private sector, but they also feared that factions within the elite (the so-called 
technocrats) would gain political power if the markets succeeded (Espinosa 1995, 54; 
Rosenberg 1992, 85). Was there also pressure from the agricultural producers? The 
ANAP initially supported the establishment of the markets, while organized CPAs 
were against them (Deere and Meurs 1992, 832-833; Rosenberg 1992, 65-66). 
However, the failure of the markets to deliver lower prices and the growing 
opposition by consumers meant that almost all ANAP support was withdrawn. The 
head of ANAP and other high-ranking officers that initially supported the markets 
were removed in 1985. At the end, the only ones supporting the markets were CCS, 
dispersed smallholders and some Cuban academicians (Espinosa 1995, 57; Rosenberg 
1992, 77-78, 82).  
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In summary, when consumers threatened with unrest, the authorities allowed the 
opening of free agricultural markets in order to improve their consumption 
possibilities. The elite implicitly recognized that free markets lead to higher 
agricultural output and better quality of food and can have the potential to lower 
prices. However, the struggles within the political elite meant that the adopted 
markets were so restrictive that the MLCs markets could not lower prices although 
they increased both production and quality of food. The consumers’ needs were 
therefore only partially met, and their initial support for the free markets faded. The 
highly controlled parallel markets were used as an alternative that, even if not 
completely fulfilling the consumers’ needs, did not involve the transfer of political 
power to the private sector. Moreover, conflicts even within the agricultural producers 
appeared, probably caused by the fear of the CPA collective members to lose their 
preferential access to production resources and services due to their incapacity to 
compete against individual farmers. 
3.3. Dismantling of state farms and opening of agricultural markets 
(1990s-2000s) 
Agricultural production in Cuba had accumulated deficiencies due to incentive 
problems and the lack of labour for agriculture, leading to food shortages in the late 
1980s. The state farms proved to be especially problematic, as their output decreased 
even when they had most of the land and production resources (Alvarez 2004a, 66, 
69-72). On top of this, a significant blow to the external sector of Cuba came about 
with the collapse of its main trading partners, the Soviet Union and the Council for 
Mutual Economic Assistance. This external shock caused a deep economic crisis, 
hitting the agricultural sector particularly hard as the state farm system depended on 
imported inputs, machinery, and fuel. The consequences for the population were 
grave, as food production and imports collapsed, causing a serious lack of food and 
spiralling inflation (Xianglin 2007, 94-96). Public unrest increased rapidly, including 
rarely seen public protests in the coastline avenue of Havana – the Malecón – 
(Hoffmann 2005, 445; Marshall 1998, 281) and the emigration towards USA of over 
50.000 Cubans in makeshift rafts from 1990 to 1994, of which over 37.000 were 
intercepted and returned to Cuba (Hoffmann 2005, 441, 445). Food consumption 
decreased causing widespread weight loss and nutrition deficiencies (Alvarez 2004a, 
161-162; Funes-Monzote 2008, 25). It is estimated that even in the late 1990s, 
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average energy and protein consumption was below the levels recommend by the 
Food and Agriculture Organization (Togores González 2003, 12). 
The profound crisis of the country in the years 1993 and 1994 carried with it the threat 
of a radical political change. The survival of the communist government may have 
seemed surprising, but one-party regimes are usually more resilient to economic 
shocks than other types of authoritarian regimes (Geddes 1999, 139-140). The Cuban 
regime responded by giving their supporters access and control over highly profitable 
business opportunities, and reduced the number of benefited supporters, thus making 
their support extremely lucrative (Corrales 2004, 56). However, shielding itself 
against dissent inside the party or the military was not enough. The increased access 
to highly profitable economic activities and a monetary reform produced a new group 
of wealthy consumers that were catered for with hard currency shops (Xianglin 2007, 
97). The majority of the consumers, however, were in danger of a famine. 
The initial response of the government in the agricultural sector was to continue a 
“rectification process” started in 1986, and to introduce small changes in the state 
farm system from 1990 to 1992 with the objective of maintaining production and 
productivity (Deere and Meurs 1992, 836; Deere 1997, 651-652). This strategy, where 
the government seeks to “perfect” the system instead of changing its basic principles, 
has been identified as a common initial response to the accumulation of economic 
problems in classical socialism (Kornai 1992, 396-397). These partial solutions did 
not increase food and agricultural production in the face of the abrupt decrease of 
imported inputs and fuel. The elite was eventually forced to search for radical 
solutions that included sacrificing some of the ideological premises held so dearly 
before, and had to start dismantling the state farm system (Deere 1997, 651-652).  
Many of the large and inefficient state farms were broken up in 1993 and transformed 
in worker-owned collective farms called UBPC (Basic Units of Cooperative 
Production). The state avoided turning the state farms into individual producers, like 
China and Vietnam had done before, and instead chose the second best option: to 
imitate the CPA collective farms. These private collectives, although less productive 
than CCS and dispersed farmers, were easier to monitor and control, and had shown 
consistently better outcomes than state farms even during the first years of the crisis 
(Alvarez 2004a, 41-42; Deere 1997, 651-652). Moreover, collective farming was 
better aligned with the communist ideology than individual property (López Labrada 
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2007, 30-34). The new collective farms only had usufruct rights over the land, were 
not represented by any organization, and were tightly controlled by the remaining 
state farms (Decree-Law Nr. 142 1993). 
Private producers had previously demonstrated that they could cope much better with 
the crisis and that they were more productive than the state sector even with limited 
production inputs and services (Alvarez and Puerta 1994, 1664-1670; González 2003, 
702-703). In addition to the creation of the UBPC collective farms, the government 
reversed the land expropriation drives of the 1960s and 1970s, and not only actively 
promoted the creation of household and collective plots for home consumption, but 
also gave away unused state land in usufruct to individuals for commercial and 
subsistence production (Deere 1997, 655; Enríquez 2000, 7; Xianglin 2007, 97). 
Producers of tobacco, coffee, cacao and other crops were given small areas with an 
average of 1,8 Ha per producer (Nova Gonzalez 2008, 4). 
Moreover, in 1994 agricultural markets were opened that were less constrained than 
the MLCs of the 1980s – the new markets, for example, allowed all producers to 
participate once they had fulfilled their obligations with the state distribution agency, 
and a higher variety of products and processed food were allowed. In addition, 
intermediaries were legally recognized. To stimulate the influx of food to the capital, 
sales in the city of Havana were taxed 5% of the gross value of the goods brought to 
the market, while sales in the rest of the country were taxed 15% (Alvarez 2004a, 100; 
Marshall 1998, 281-282). The newly opened markets initially decreased the prices and 
flooded the capital city with produce (Deere 1997, 662-663). However, they were still 
restricted by the prohibition to sell milk, beef, eggs, and other high demand products, 
and the potential food supply was reduced by the high quotas demanded by the state 
to UBPC and CPA collective producers before they received permission to sell in 
these markets. These factors translated in an insufficient food supply which kept the 
prices high. An additional market, supplied by state and UBPC producers and with 
fixed maximum prices, was opened by the state in 1999 to lower the prices (Alvarez 
2004a, 100-108). 
The reforms achieved some recovery in the agricultural sector as compared to the 
1993-1994 crisis levels (González 2003, 725). However, in 2007 production levels for 
most sectors had not recovered to 1989 levels, including sugar (86% lower), cattle 
(24% less cattle heads), eggs (12% less) and milk (57% less). The only sector that 
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experienced growth was the production of tubers, which more than doubled in the 
period 1989-2007 (Mesa Lago 2008, 5, 8-9). The new UBPC farms have suffered 
from low productivity and profitability since their creation (Alvarez 2005, 125-134; 
López Labrada 2007, 43, 48-57). Moreover, there is some evidence that the majority 
of the new individual usufructuaries and UBPC workers are poor, indicating that they 
were not able to accumulate wealth as a result of the reforms (Leyva Remón 2006, 98-
105). Why did the reforms fail to increase production? 
There is evidence that the reforms were altered by the bureaucracy. The reforms 
weakened the de facto political power of the bureaucrats as around 40% of the land 
they managed was transformed in UBPC farms, and part of their monopoly in 
marketing and distribution was transferred to free markets. The reforms threatened to 
take away the rents they could extract out of controlling producers, as well as their 
access to side benefits. In order to safeguard some of the previous power balance, the 
new UBPCs were kept under the supervision of state farms (renamed enterprises), but 
the intervention of the bureaucracy in the new collective farms grew and was 
eventually identified as a factor limiting their performance (López Labrada 2007, 79-
81). 
The study carried out by the authors on UBPC cattle farms in 2007 and 2008 showed 
some of the alterations of the reforms made by the bureaucracy. These alterations 
affected the administrative functioning of the UBPC farms and lowered their 
incentives. For example, although the law states that UBPC collectives are 
independent in voting for their own leaders and administrators (Decree-Law Nr. 142 
1993; Resolution Nr. 629 2004), state enterprises directly selected the administrators 
of at least two of the UBPC visited. Moreover, state enterprises did not allow the 
UBPC farms to include pensioners in their work force or administration. One of the 
visited UBPC farms hired experts illegally, while another one paid the pensioners 
informally in kind. The law also states that UBPC farms can sell their production 
surplus in agricultural markets once they have honoured state quotas (Decree-Law Nr. 
142 1993; Resolution Nr. 629 2004), however, 16 out of 30 interviewed UBPC farms 
were not given permissions to sell their surplus production. Another central point of 
the law regarding the UBPC farms is the correspondence between the workers’ effort 
and the salary they receive, but in practice, only certain maximum salaries were 
permitted. 
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Yet another aspect modified by the bureaucracy implies not only reduced incentives 
for UBPC workers, but may also endanger their food access. The self-consumption 
collective plots that were the centre of the reform in the 1990s have been restricted by 
the bureaucrats controlling inputs, credits and the rationed food distribution system. 
The law states that the UBPC has the right to produce food for home consumption of 
its workers in a collective plot (Decree-Law Nr. 142 1993; Resolution Nr. 629 2004). 
Despite this, a large percentage of the production for “home consumption” (40% in 
average, but up to 100% in two of the farms visited) had to be sold to the state food 
distribution system. Moreover, UBPC farms were not given permissions to invest in 
their collective home consumption activities by buying machinery or building 
infrastructure, nor were they given credits to start or expand food production 
activities. 
In summary, the balance of power in the agricultural sector changed in the early 
1990s, when the private producers gained relative importance for the survival of the 
elite in the face of a serious food crisis. The interest of the political elite was to 
increase agricultural production (especially food) and economic efficiency in order to 
avoid public unrest that would endanger their permanence in power. The ruling elite 
recognized that private use rights over land are superior to collective or state property. 
However, in order to keep some of its power over the land while at the same time 
boosting production, the producers were offered only partial land rights. The state 
dependent UBPC farms, moreover, were not allowed to enter the ANAP and therefore 
had no political voice. In this way, reforms were never complete as the elite tried to 
control and limit the accumulation of power by the private producers and the new 
UBPC farms. At the same time, bureaucrats used their de facto power to block, alter 
and even reverse the reforms in order to stop their loss of power.  
3.4. Raul Castro’s presidency and reforms (2007-2010) 
The first decade of the new millennium encountered challenges for Cuba’s political 
elite both in the economic and the political spheres. Agricultural production stagnated 
or even decreased for most products and the costs for importing food grew due to the 
sudden increase of world food prices. UBPC farms needed constant financial support 
by the state to cover their losses. Moreover, the organized opposition proposed 
changes using their constitutional rights, to which the government responded with 
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repression (HRW 2009, 41-44). And in 2006, Fidel Castro fell sick and was 
succeeded by his brother, Raúl Castro, who was formally elected president in 2008 by 
the National Assembly. Internal struggles erupted between factions in the communist 
party, leading to the removal of top figures (Ravsberg 2009, 1-3). 
Agriculture was displaced in importance by services and tourism, and whereas at the 
end of the 1960s, agriculture accounted for around half of the gross domestic product 
(GDP) and 90% of exports, in 2007 it accounted for less than 5% of the GDP 
(Blutstein et al. 1971, 299; Mesa Lago 2008, 9). However, food scarcity due to low 
agricultural production, added to increased costs for importing food, have made 
agricultural reform a priority and have led to the announcement of several changes 
(Peters 2009, 4; Rodríguez 2008, 1-4). In a recent speech, Raúl Castro recognizes the 
potential for food production that individual farmers have, and mentions the need of 
changing the “organizational forms” in order to let producers sell their surplus in 
markets ruled by offer and demand (Castro Ruz 2009, 3). 
The reforms announced include improving the incentives for agricultural production 
by settling long standing debts with farmers and raising official prices. Beginning in 
July 2007, the official prices for some of the most controlled products (beef, milk, and 
more recently, coffee) were greatly increased (Peters 2009, 5). In the case of the 
UBPC farms visited by the authors, the average price for milk paid by the state 
increased from 0.99 to 2.45 Cuban pesos per litre, while beef increased from 2.30 to 
5.06 pesos per Kg (live weight). Additionally, the state has started granting usufruct 
rights over idle state land to new and established private farmers and UBPCs (Decree-
Law Nr. 259 2008). There is so far no official information on changes in the land 
tenure structure of the country, but according to official news articles, almost one 
million hectares have been handed to natural and legal persons up to 2010 (Puig 
Meneses and Varela Pérez 2010, 2). This would mean that private producers may 
have increased the proportion of Cuba’s agricultural land under their control from 
27% in 2007 to between 30% and 41% in 2010 (Marino Murillo 2010, 2; ONE 2010a, 
Table 9.1; Pérez Sáez et al. 2010, 1). The reforms will also improve incentives for 
UBPC producers by formally eliminating caps on the maximum salary that workers 
are allowed to earn (Resolution Nr. 09/2008; Rodríguez 2008, 1).  
The most interesting of many of these changes is that their objective seems to be to 
erode the de facto power of the bureaucrats, in order to enhance production of UBPC 
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and private producers. According to a high ranking official of the Ministry of 
Agriculture met on the 06 February and 25 March, 2008, state officials will be moved 
to different towns to limit their influence with producers. Additionally, state 
enterprises in all municipalities in the country will be reorganized to decrease their 
control over agricultural producers, particularly UBPC farms. The reorganization 
includes closing and merging state enterprises, as well as laying-off up to 40.000 
redundant employees (Pérez Cabrera 2010, 1). These changes translate into a partial 
liberalization of certain activities. For example, the legalization of the direct sale of 
milk to consumers and retailers is aimed at lowering transport costs and storage losses 
(Carrobello 2007, 2-4). Other changes include the slow elimination of products from 
the rationing system and their liberalization in agricultural markets (Castro Ruz 2008, 
6). The reforms will create new shops for inputs and production resources where 
producers can choose freely what to buy, substituting the centralized allocation 
(Marino Murillo 2010, 3). 
The reforms not only weaken the political power of the bureaucrats, but are also 
transferring this power to the producers as their increased presence in the official 
media implies. The ANAP has been very vocal in its critique against the bureaucracy 
and these critiques have appeared repeatedly in official newspaper articles (Pérez Sáez 
et al. 2010). However, information collected by the authors during February to March 
2008 and April 2009 suggest that two associations of producers and academicians are 
also gaining strength in lobbying for changes with the political elite. The Cuban 
Associations of Livestock Producers (ACPA) and of Agricultural and Forestry 
Technicians (ACTAF) group together private, state and UBPC producers, as well as 
scientists and technicians. Both associations are local counterparts of international non 
governmental organizations (NGO) working for rural development in the country. 
Their local visibility stems from the implementation of projects that not only 
demonstrate technical and organizational improvements to the elite, but also bring 
foreign capital to Cuba. 
So far the reforms have failed in increasing agricultural production, as has been 
publicly recognized (Nova Gonzalez 2010, 1-3; ONE 2010c, 3). It would seem that 
the bureaucracy is blocking the reforms by slowing down administrative processes, 
harassing producers to offset benefits gained by the reform, or substituting eliminated 
bureaucratic controls for new ones. Dissident and government newspaper articles 
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accuse the bureaucrats of numerous actions that have resulted in decreased 
agricultural production and food availability in the markets of the city of Havana. 
These actions include bombarding the new land usufructuaries with numerous 
permissions and fines, slowing down the granting of land use titles, as well as placing 
a multitude of restrictions to the transport and sales of agricultural products (Garve 
2010, 1; Rodríguez 2010, 1-2; Varela Pérez 2010a, 1-3; Varela Pérez 2010b, 1-2).  
In summary, the recent reforms seem to point to a strategy of decreasing the power 
and influence of the bureaucracy (without eliminating it completely), and at the same 
time, increasing the importance of producers. Agricultural producers are being 
promoted by allocating more land to private farming, improving the incentives of 
private and UBPC producers and increasing the voice of ANAP and other producer 
associations in official media and decision making. While input markets apparently 
will be liberalized, output markets will continue being restricted to market surplus 
after contracted sales to the state have been satisfied. It is not known if the food 
rationing system supplied through these contracted sales will be totally eliminated, but 
current changes point to a progressive liberalization of many food items. The 
bureaucracy is accused of blocking the reforms, especially the reorganization of 
agricultural enterprises and the distribution of idle state land.  
4. Summary and conclusions 
We consider that the agricultural sector of Cuba is very interesting because political 
power is not in the hands of only one group. Private producers, for example, have 
managed to increase their wealth and resources and are now owners of around a third 
of the total agricultural land in Cuba. Many of them are organized under an 
association that has representatives in the highest circles of the government. The 
agricultural sector is marked by permanent conflicts caused by the coexistence of this 
group, defined by their strong interests on the establishment of free markets and full 
property rights over their land and other production resources, with other groups that 
have opposing interests, including the political elite and bureaucrats. 
The political elite, despite knowing that secure property rights and free markets can 
improve agricultural production, has failed to reform these inefficient institutions. On 
one hand, this is due to the fact that reforms would change the power balance between 
the groups. On the other hand, there has not been enough pressure to change these 
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inefficient institutions or the elite has found alternative ways to respond to the 
pressure. Property rights over land and free markets are only partially adopted when 
external shocks or internal conditions result in threats to the elite’s permanence in 
power. Consumer unrest has been counteracted by suppressing public opinion and 
voice by civic groups and permitting the mass emigration of dissidents. Moreover, the 
elite has found various options to fulfil the needs of at least a fraction of the 
consumers. These alternative options include substitute institutions like state 
controlled markets targeting consumers that have access to remittances or income in 
hard currency.  
The study of the evolution of the agricultural sector of Cuba in the past decades show 
that reforms are at danger of being blocked if they reduce the political power of any 
group. Among the potential political losers we find not only the political elite, but also 
the bureaucrats and some of the private producers. For example, some private 
producers became political losers and opposed open markets due to their lower 
productivity. However, in more recent periods, the political losers opposing the 
reforms seem to be the bureaucrats. The change to a more efficient agriculture would 
reduce their influence on markets and on other producers. The reforms would increase 
the power of private agricultural producers and can give de facto or de jure political 
power to new groups, such as the UBPC farms, new land usufructuaries, or private 
transporters and distributors of agricultural produce and inputs. 
The recently announced reforms suggest that the political elite has chosen to sacrifice 
the agricultural bureaucracy in order to increase the productivity of private and UBPC 
producers. The reforms include massive lay-offs, the elimination or merging of state 
farms and enterprises and the gradual elimination of the food rationing system. While 
these appear to be steps in the right direction on the reform pathway, it is suggested 
that a successful reform of the agricultural sector might additionally require a 
compromise between the political elite and various stakeholders. The potential 
negative effects of the reforms on the bureaucracy, consumers and producers could be 
minimized by allowing their active participation in the shaping of these reforms. 
Giving voice to the consumers and the civic society would be an important step in this 
direction. Additionally, the bureaucracy and other political losers might be given a 
compensation for their losses in terms of income. Such compensations (for example 
for early retirement, or training for alternative jobs in an emerging private agricultural 
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sector) could be financed by taxes on additional income generated from the reforms. 
Such a compromise between the elite and other stakeholders would reduce the 
opposition to the reforms, and can also prevent the impoverishment among political 
losers and other groups that will not (at least initially) gain from the reform process. 
The remarkable social security system that Cuba has managed to maintain even 
during economic crises should not be tarnished by ignoring the consequences of 
reforms in terms of poverty and vulnerability, especially in the face of the possible 
disappearance of the food rationing system and the lay-off of public employees. 
Cuba ought to consider a gradual reform process toward liberalized markets and 
improved property rights while retaining major food and social security functions and 
by introducing progressive taxation systems. The experiences in transition countries 
of Eastern Europe, China and Vietnam can offer insights on the possibilities and 
limits of reform processes (Rozelle and Swinnen 2004). These reforms do not always 
entail the radical change in political structures. The governments of Vietnam and 
China have quite successfully retained their political power while providing time-
bound land use rights to farmers and liberalizing markets (Lau et al. 2000; Rozelle 
and Swinnen 2004). Cuba could also benefit from the accumulated experience of 
these two countries regarding the effects of reforms on poverty and inequality (Luong 
and Unger 1998).  
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CHAPTER 5. SUMMARY AND DISCUSSION OF RESULTS 
 
 
 
 
 
This dissertation studies the institutions of the agricultural sector of Cuba, their 
impacts in terms of production and food security, and their evolution. The results are 
presented in three research papers that will be summarized below. 
The first paper (Chapter 2) describes the institutional framework of Cuba’s cattle 
sector and evaluates the impact it has on agricultural production by using secondary 
and primary data. It is found that the cattle sector of Cuba has a complex structure and 
is governed by a number of institutions that have been shown to lead to low 
productivity in other countries. Three main producer types can be recognized based on 
their property rights over land and cattle, and their organizational dependence from 
the state. The producer types are identified as state farms; state-dependent collective 
farms (called Unidades Básicas de Producción Cooperativa, or Basic Units of 
Cooperative Production UBPC) with land in usufruct; and private smallholders with 
different degrees of land tenure and a higher independence from the state. The state 
and UBPC producers are found in this research to underuse their land, while private 
producers have smaller and more diversified farms, but apparently tend to overuse 
their land as well as communal pastures. Private producers have a better access to 
illegal milk (and maybe beef) markets that offer much higher prices than the legal 
markets forced upon state and UBPC producers. However, the costs for participating 
in the illegal markets, especially for beef, are very high as producers face the threat of 
lengthy jail convictions, fines, confiscation and forced sale of their livestock. 
It was found that property rights over land and cattle are incomplete and insecure in 
Cuba. The UBPC producers have limited rights to residual income from cattle 
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production, while state producers have practically none and instead have economic 
returns due to the administrative control of other producers. Private producers have 
higher benefits from their cattle production activities through home consumption and 
access to illegal milk markets. However, private producers’ ownership of cattle is 
more insecure as compared with state or UBPC producers. The cattle sector of Cuba is 
also characterized by a lack of mechanisms to enter and (in the case of state and 
UBPC farms) to exit the cattle production sector. This causes an overall decrease of 
efficiency by forbidding efficient producers to enter the sector or to increase their 
farms, and on the other hand, by not allowing the worst producers to exit production. 
According to official statistical reports, it is clear that private producers are more 
successful than UBPC collectives and state farms as they are the only ones showing a 
constant increase of the herd size in the last years. The fact that at least one producer 
type is able to increase its herd puts in doubt the prevailing idea that production 
problems of the sector are a result of technical problems, lack of resources or climatic 
factors. The mechanisms and results presented in this study are only a first exploration 
of the topic due to the lack of primary research on production, institutions, informal 
markets and prices. The results presented in the first paper, even if restricted to the 
cattle sector, could inform the study of other productive sectors in Cuba, especially 
those that share similarly restricted access to input and output markets. 
Whereas state and private producers remain largely unexplored, the second paper 
presented in this dissertation covers some of the knowledge gaps regarding the 
institutions and performance of UBPC collective producers in the cattle sector. This 
paper (Chapter 3) contributes to the literature in several ways. On the one hand, it is 
one of only two known analyses that quantify household expenditures in Cuba (the 
other study was carried out in the city of Havana in 2001), and the first to study the 
frequency and diversity of food consumption among rural households in the country. 
Furthermore, this study evaluates the incentives of workers at UBPC collective farms 
and concludes on their impact on supply to the food rationing system of Cuba, as well 
as on the food security of the households of UBPC workers. Despite the fact that the 
primary data used in this research suffers from representativeness problems due to the 
intervention of authorities during the process aimed at drawing a truly random, 
representative household sample for my research, its analysis is still considered to be 
very valuable due to the current lack of quantitative and qualitative studies focusing 
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on Cuban rural households. Moreover, the results bring to light several facts and 
policy implications that have been written about but rarely documented and supported 
through primary data and empirical evidence. 
Using principal component analysis (PCA) to investigate several dimensions of 
poverty in Cuban rural households, the second paper finds that relative poverty, 
diversity in food consumption, and self-reported quality of life in the studied 
households is mainly characterized by differences in the quality and frequency of food 
items that are not supplied by the state’s food rationing system, but come from 
individual or collective food production for home consumption. Moreover, the results 
from household and collective farm data analysis, as well as in-depth interviews with 
managers and workers of collective farms, show that relative poverty, food diversity, 
and quality of life have no association at all with the economic or productive 
performance in the main activities (in this case, beef and milk) of the UBPC farms. 
This lack of association exposes severe incentive problems in collective agricultural 
production, as workers are not rewarded for better or more work in the UBPC farms. 
At the same time, both collective and private food production compete for labour and 
resources with beef and milk production in the UBPC collective. These incentive 
problems hurt the state’s food rationing system that should be supplied with milk and 
beef, and therefore the food availability for the Cuban population. More grave still is 
the fact that the food security of the UBPC workers is also hurt when the land these 
workers can devote to private and collective food production for home consumption is 
restricted by the state as a way to “protect” milk and beef production. 
The second paper derives a number of conclusions for food and agricultural policy 
and calls for more socio-economic research in Cuba that might provide useful 
information for the reform pathway in food policy of the Cuban government. To 
correct the incentive problems exposed in these results, the Cuban government might 
consider accelerating the emerging reforms towards a system with greater private 
incentives and liberalized markets for land, labour, and agricultural commodities, 
especially food. But, are these reforms possible? Or will they be reversed like in 
previous periods? To address these questions, the third paper explores the evolution of 
the economic institutions in the agricultural sector of Cuba. 
The third paper (Chapter 4) shows how the agricultural sector of the country is 
marked by permanent conflicts that arise between private producers, defined by their 
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strong interests for the establishment of free markets and full property rights over their 
land and production resources, and other actors that have opposing interests, including 
the political elite and bureaucrats that control agricultural production and marketing. 
Despite knowing that secure property rights and free markets can improve agricultural 
production (as is evident in several public speeches), the political elite has failed to 
reform the sector’s inefficient institutions because these would increase the wealth 
and political power of private producers. In addition, the failure to change these 
institutions comes about because there has not been enough pressure from consumers 
to change the inefficient institutions. Apart from suppressing public opinion and voice 
by civic groups, or allowing mass emigrations, the elite seems to have also found 
alternative ways to respond to the pressure of (mainly urban) consumers. These 
include substitute institutions like state controlled markets supplied by imported food 
and special shops for hard currency. 
Property rights over land and market incentives for producers, traders and consumers 
alike have been only partially recognized in Cuba and solely during times of extreme 
crises when external shocks or internal conditions resulted in threats to the elite’s 
permanence in power. However, these half hearted reforms have been reversed 
whenever the pressure from consumers over the elite decreases, or when the 
bureaucracy or other groups have blocked or opposed the reforms as their political 
power is weakened by these changes. Clearly, a more efficient agriculture based on 
liberalized markets and private property rights would increase the power of most of 
the private agricultural producers, and also give political power to new and emerging 
groups, such as the UBPC farmers, land usufructuaries, or private transporters and 
distributors of agricultural produce and inputs. This political power redistribution 
would occur at the expense of the bureaucracy in state farms and agricultural or food 
distribution state enterprises, but the less productive private producers are also 
potential losers in the reforms. These political actors voice their opposition or support 
to reforms through legal representatives as in the case of private producers 
(associations of farmers), or, in the case of the bureaucracy, through organized or 
unorganized actions that cause the delay, reversal or alteration of the reforms. 
The recently announced reforms suggest that the political elite has chosen to sacrifice 
the agricultural bureaucracy with massive lay-offs, the elimination or merging of state 
farms and enterprises and the gradual elimination of the food rationing system. While 
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these appear to be certainly steps in the right direction on the reform pathway, it 
remains to be seen whether these reforms are being implemented and defended by the 
elite. Moreover, the results presented in this paper suggest that to increase agricultural 
production and decrease food losses without the danger of political opposition and the 
blocking of reforms, a political compromise might be needed between the elite and 
other political actors. The bureaucracy and other groups may need to be given a 
compensation for their losses in terms of income, business opportunities, and political 
capital. Such compensations (for example for early retirement, training for alternative 
jobs in an emerging private agricultural sector) could be financed by taxes on 
additional income generated from a liberalization of agricultural input and output 
markets and the recognition of property rights in land use and agricultural and food 
marketing. Cuba may as well carefully weigh the consequences of reforms in terms of 
poverty and vulnerability if the country does not want to tarnish its remarkable social 
security system. These consequences might be especially important among the 
political losers and among those labourers, farmers and consumers that will not (at 
least initially) gain from the reform process. 
Outlook for research 
The results presented in this dissertation leave more questions open than the ones it 
answers. Cuba, with its mixture of producer types, offers many possibilities to explore 
the effects of institutions on productivity, resource use, investments, or risk attitudes. 
But this is not only an opportunity, but also a necessity if agricultural problems will 
be solved. Since most of the agricultural research in Cuba is based on the examination 
of highly aggregated official statistics (Nova Gonzalez 2008) or is carried out under 
experimental conditions (Funes-Monzote 2008), the results lack the detailed 
information needed in order to evaluate the effects of the institutional framework on 
the various types of producers. One of the topics that should be further explored is, for 
example, the study of differences among private producers caused by their variety in 
land tenure, farm size, experience as farmers (traditional farmers as compared to new 
usufructuaries), and degrees of cooperation (from dispersed and landless farmers, to 
credit and service cooperatives or collective farms). Another topic that calls for 
further research is the use of penal legislation to control “cattle crimes” and its impact 
on livestock production costs, as well as in the illegal trade of beef. 
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However, the focus should not stay on production alone. The further study of its link 
with rural poverty, food security and nutrition are vital for the much needed policy 
reforms if the country wants to decrease its dependence on imported food while 
maintaining its social achievements. Poverty studies in Cuba are limited to income 
calculations based on either primary or secondary information on public or UBPC 
salaries, pensions and other permitted sources of income (Añé Aguiloche 2005; Leyva 
Remón 2006; Togores González 2004). However, the results obtained in my research 
show that rural households derive an important share of their income from other 
sources including home production for consumption and sale. These activities (and 
probably others as yet unknown) may be of great importance in defining poverty and 
inequality at household level as well as indicate a huge potential under improved 
property rights and liberalized markets, and they should therefore be further studied, 
especially in the poor rural areas. By disregarding all “unofficial” income sources, the 
income at household level is underestimated, main income sources overlooked and 
promising pathways for agricultural and rural development in Cuba are ignored.  
Moreover, I consider that the agricultural sector of Cuba is extremely interesting 
because political and economic power are not in the hands of only one group. The 
coexistence of highly profitable pockets (for example in vegetable production in the 
outskirts of the city of Havana) and highly controlled and inefficient sectors provides 
a laboratory to evaluate theories of institutional change and political interactions.  
Outlook for development aid 
The findings presented in the three papers point to major problems in many rural 
development projects aimed at improving agricultural production in Cuba. I will 
describe these problems and propose some alternative paths that could, in my view, 
result in more sustainable and positive results. 
Differences between producers 
In the project used as a case study, as well as in others observed during data 
collection, it was apparent that rural development projects tended to treat private and 
UBPC producers as if their production problems were the same: lack of resources, 
technology, or training. However, my research results and the examination of 
secondary sources point to deep differences between these producers and the 
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challenges and opportunities they face. Based on secondary information, it seems that 
traditional private producers need technological and financial support in order to 
improve their productivity with their limited resources. In their case, the NGOs would 
need to function as service and input suppliers, substituting or complementing the 
state enterprises. On the other hand, the little information published regarding new 
land usufructuaries seems to indicate their need of support, but without further 
research it is not possible to know whether their apparent disadvantages stem from 
lack of resources, technology, or training in production and marketing.  
The UBPC farms have completely different problems when compared with traditional 
or new private producers. The Welthungerhilfe project has a very good strategy to 
deal with the weaknesses of the UBPC farms, but some of their suppositions 
regarding the households are incorrect. The project is based on the – at first sight 
seemingly logic – idea that increasing the economic performance of the UBPC farm 
will result in an improvement of the living conditions of the workers and their 
families. This, however, does not hold true due to the legal regulations and informal 
rules that govern the UBPC’s production and the distribution of their income. 
Moreover, any improvements in the UBPC production will probably not be 
sustainable once the project or the support stops due to pervasive incentive problems 
as the root cause that the project does not openly seek to change. In order to address 
the incentive structure – perhaps in a politically accepted way–, the NGO should 
better explore the needs of the UBPC workers and find ways to connect their 
wellbeing – for example via incentives for better or more work and responsibility –
with the productive objectives of the UBPC farm. The current changes addressed by 
the NGO in seeking to open up private markets for UBPC produce is only effective if 
the workers participate in the gain from private marketing. 
Losers from reforms and alternative livelihoods 
The rural development project observed in Cuba focuses on producers as its main 
targets, however I consider that the identification of other actors in the agricultural 
sector that are expected to lose with reforms and the careful examination of their 
needs and opportunities should be a priority. For example, most of the rural 
development projects either ignore the state enterprises and farms, or treat them as 
input and service suppliers (like the Welthungerhilfe project). The bureaucrats that 
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control production resources, distribution and marketing of agricultural produce have 
a pivotal role in the present day functioning and future prospects of change of the 
agricultural sector. Moreover, recent official messages suggest that many will be 
made redundant if reforms to improve agriculture are implemented. This will put their 
living standards at risk, and they will, quite understandably, try to block these 
reforms. While it seems the government has no plan for the bureaucracy of state 
enterprises and farms during the present reform period, the NGOs could very well 
contribute by offering alternative occupations for the workers that will be laid-off, or 
even for the whole state enterprises. This could not only facilitate the transition to a 
more productive agriculture by decreasing the political opposition, but would also 
avoid the creation of more poverty and food insecurity in the country. 
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